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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nondiscrimination is a fundamental principle of the world trading system. The Preamble of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement) proclaims "the elimination of
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations" as one of the
chief objectives of the World Trade Organization (WTO).' The principle
of nondiscrimination is embodied in numerous provisions of the WTO
Agreement, which render the principle into concrete legal obligations of
WTO Members. Among these provisions, the most prominent ones are
the most-favored-nation treatment (MFN) and national treatment (NT)
clauses. These clauses, in one form or another, appear in the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),' the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS), 3 the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), 4 and various other agreements of
the WTO.' In addition to the MFN and NT clauses, the WTO agreements

I See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, pmbl., cl.
3, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
2 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 (GATT 1947), which has been incorporated into General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex IA,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994) [hereinafter GATT]. Major MFN clauses, in
various forms, appear in GATT Articles 1:1, 11:1, V:5, IX:1, and XIII:1. Major NT
clauses appear in GATT Articles 111:2 and 111:4.
3 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra
note 1,Annex IB, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. The
principal MFN and NT clauses are set out in GATS Articles II and XVII respectively.
I Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The principal MFN and NT clauses are set out in TRIPS
Articles 3 and 4 respectively.
I For example, MFN obligations are found in Article 2.2 of the Agreement on
Safeguards [hereinafter the Safeguard Agreement]; Article 2.1 of the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade [hereinafter the TBT Agreement]; Article 2.1 of the
Agreement on Preshipment Inspection; Article 9.2 of the Agreement on
Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
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also contain more generally worded anti-discrimination provisions, the
most notable examples of which include the nondiscrimination clauses in
GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV, and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS Agreement).6
The MFN and NT provisions define nondiscrimination in relatively
precise terms. For example, GAT Article 1:1, the most comprehensive
expression of the GATT MFN obligation, requires a WTO Member to
accord, immediately and unconditionally, "any advantage, favor, privilege
or immunity" it grants to any product of any other country to the "like
product" of all other WTO Members, with respect to (i) customs duties
and charges levied on imports and exports or on the international transfer
of payments for imports or exports, (ii) the method of levying such duties
and charges, (iii) all rules and formalities in connection with importation
and exportation, and (iv) internal taxation and regulations affecting the
sale and use of imported products.7 GAIT Article III, which states the
GATr NT obligations, prohibits a Member from imposing internal taxes
or charges on products imported from another Member "in excess of"
those applied to "like domestic products" and obliges a Member to
accord to such imported products "treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin" with respect to internal
regulations.'
In contrast to the MFN and NT clauses, the general nondiscrimination
provisions of the WTO agreements employ the term "discrimination" per
se, without providing specific parameters to define the obligation. For
example, GATT Article XX, which permits a Member to adopt measures
inconsistent with its GATT obligations for certain policy reasons, imposes
[hereinafter the Antidumping Agreement]; and Article 19.3 of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures [hereinafter the SCM Agreement]. NT
obligations are found in Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, and Article 2 of the
Agreement on Trade-related Measures (TRIMS). See WTO Agreement, supra note 1,
Annex 1A. In addition, an MFN obligation also appears in Article 3.7 of the
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dispute, Apr.
15, 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 125
[hereinafter DSUI. Both MFN and NT obligations appear in Article III of the
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), one of the Uruguay Round
Plurilateral Agreements. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 4.
6 See Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art.
2.3, WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex IA [hereinafter SPS Agreement]. For a
detailed discussion of the nondiscrimination clauses in GATT Article XX, GATS
Article XIV, and the SPS Agreement Article 2.3, see infra Section IV. Examples of
other generally worded antidiscrimination clauses include GATT, supra note 2, art.
XVII:I and Ad art. XIV, paragraph 1; Agreement on Rules of Origin, arts. 2(d) and
3(c), WTO Agreement, supra note 1, Annex 1A; TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 4(d) and
27.1.
7 See GAY-', supra note 2, art. 1.1.
8 See GAT'T, supra note 2, arts. 111:2 and 111:4.
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on the Member an obligation not to apply such measures "in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail." 9 A similarly
worded provision appears in Article XIV of GATS and Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement.'" In a recent dispute settlement case, the WTO Appellate Body (AB) has interpreted the term "nondiscriminatory" contained
in the Enabling Clause, which exempts preferential treatment granted to
developing countries from the MFN obligation under GATT Article 1:1,
as a binding legal obligation on the preference-giving Members." When
the term "discrimination" or "nondiscrimination" is used in such a general manner, questions arise as to the precise meaning of the term.
The notion of nondiscrimination is a complex one. Its content is highly
elastic and context-dependent. Recognizing the "infinite complexity"
entailed by the concept, a WTO panel once warned: "'Discrimination' is
a term to be avoided whenever more precise standards are available, and
when employed, it is a term to be interpreted with caution, and with care
to add no more precision than the concept contains."' 2
Despite such perceived difficulties in defining the concept, the Appellate Body has recently interpreted the generic term "non-discriminatory"
as a requirement of not treating similarly-situated countries differently.'
This interpretation is a significant development in WTO jurisprudence
because it introduces a key for defining the general obligation of nondiscrimination under WTO law. Under this interpretation, discrimination
occurs only when differential treatment is accorded to "similarly situated" countries; thus, the central issue is to determine the basis for comparing similarity between WTO Members.
Indeed, the concept of "similarly situated" underlies all nondiscrimination obligations of the WTO. The concept is obviously embodied in the
above-noted general provisions that prohibit arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the "same,"" "like '" or "similar"' 6 conditions prevail. In essence, what these generally-worded antidiscrimination clauses require is equal treatment of Members that are
"similarly situated" on the basis of their prevailing conditions. Moreover,
the concept of "similarly situated" is also embodied in the MFN and NT
9 GATI', supra note 2, art. XX.
'o See GATS, supra note 3, art. IV; See SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.3.
11 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Grantingof
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, $$ 143-147, WT/DS2461AB/R (Apr. 7,
2004) (adopted Apr. 20, 2004) [hereinafter EC-Preferences].
12 Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, $1 7.94,
WT/DS114/R (March 17, 2000) (adopted Apr. 7, 2000) (referring to the term
"discrimination" contained in Article 27.1 of the TRIPS).
13 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11, 1 153.
14 GATT, supra note 2, art. XX.
15 GATS, supra note 3, art. XIV.
16 SPS, supra note 6, art. 2.3.
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obligations. In a general sense, the MFN and NT clauses designate all
Members as "similarly situated" on the basis and within the parameters
specified in the particular clauses. For example, under the MFN and NT
clauses of GATT and GATS, the basis for classifying similarly-situated
Members is defined by the concept of "like products,"' 7 "like services '"18
or "like service suppliers."' 9 Whether two products or services are "like"
is conceptually the same question as whether they are similarly situated.
The concept of "similarly situated," therefore, controls the definition of
MFN and NT obligations under GATT and GATS.
Identifying the concept of "similarly situated" in the nondiscrimination
provisions of the WTO, however, is merely the first step towards defining
nondiscrimination under WTO law. The critical issue remains as to the
basis or criteria for determining similarity or likeness. In other words,
how do we determine that X is a "like product" of Y, or conditions prevailing in Country A are the "same," "like" or "similar" to the conditions
prevailing in Country B? In fact, when the issue of discrimination arises,
the question is almost never whether the similarly-situated should be
treated alike, but whether the subjects concerned should be deemed as
similarly situated. The real question, therefore, is how to determine the
relevant criteria for comparing similarity or likeness between the subjects
concerned.
As a conceptual matter, whenever a WTO tribunal makes a finding on
discrimination, it has also made a determination, explicitly or implicitly,
on the likeness or similarity between products, services, or nationals of
the Members. Yet, the question of how likeness or similarity should be
determined has never been answered coherently. Although the concept of
"like products" has generated a substantial body of GATI/WTO jurisprudence, 2" it remains unclear when the tribunals should use a particular
factor to define likeness. In fact, the AB has suggested that what constitute "like products" can only be determined on a case-by-case basis, subject to the individual, discretionary judgment of the treaty interpreter,
and that no one approach to exercising that judgment will be appropriate
for all cases. 2 ' As for the concept of "like conditions" in the generallyworded antidiscrimination provisions of the WTO, only a handful of cases
have interpreted it thus far. In these few cases, the tribunals have not
focused on the issue of what conditions are relevant in determining similarity between the countries concerned. 2
17 See GATT, supra note 2, arts. 1:1, 111:2 and 111:4.
is See GATS, supra note 3, arts. 11:1 and XVII:1.
19 Id.

20 See infra Section III.
21 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 19, WT/DS8/AB/

R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R
[hereinafter Japan-Alcohol].
22 See infra Section IV.

(Oct. 4, 1996)

(adopted Nov. 1, 1996)
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Given the central importance of the concept of "similarly situated" in
defining nondiscrimination under WTO law, it is highly unsatisfactory to
leave the critical question of how to determine similarity largely unanswered. More importantly, the lack of a coherent approach to analyzing
the issue contributes little to "providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system."23 It is one thing to suggest that likeness decisions should be made on a case-by-case basis which will unavoidably
involve an element of individual discretion of the treaty interpreter; it is
quite another, however, to believe that there can be no coherent
approach to analyzing the issue of likeness or similarity under WTO law.
This paper attempts to explore and develop such an analytical
approach. Drawing from general moral philosophy on equality and from
nondiscrimination jurisprudence developed under the United States constitutional law, Section II of the paper sets forth several basic propositions. These propositions address the questions of how to determine the
relevance of a particular criterion to the comparison of similarity and
what may influence the decision to use or reject a relevant criterion in
making the comparison. Based on these propositions, a general approach
is formulated to assist the determination of "likeness" or "similarity"
within the WTO context. The approach identifies the general steps necessary to analyze the likeness or similarity issues and the kind of normative
judgment that will have to be made in the process.
The next two sections employ this general approach to examine the
"likeness" and "similarity" analyses made by WTO tribunals under various WTO provisions. Section III deals with the tribunals' treatment of the
likeness concept within the MFN and NT provisions. It focuses on the
interpretation of "like products" under GATT Article III, where WTO
likeness jurisprudence is most developed, and evaluates the interpretive
approach of the tribunals in the context of a debate over what is known
as the "aim and effects" test. Section IV deals with the "similarly situated" concept outside the realm of MFN and NT provisions. It examines
the nondiscrimination requirements under the chapeau provisions of
GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV, SPS Articles 2.3 and 5.5, and
the Enabling Clause. Since there have been only a handful of cases
involving the interpretation of these requirements, and since WTO jurisprudence on the similarity of "conditions" and "situations" is still at an
early stage of development, detailed analyses are made in this section to
assess the tribunals' interpretations of the "similarly situated" concept
under each of these provisions.
Section V of the paper sets forth certain conclusions on the significance
of the analytical approach developed in this study for defining nondiscrimination under WTO law. On the whole, applying this approach to the
specific cases demonstrates that the "similarly-situated" paradigm provides a powerful analytical tool to address the issues of likeness or simi23 DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2.
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larity in the WTO context. It helps to form a clear perspective on some of
the most perplexing issues in WTO jurisprudence and expose gaps, ambiguities, and inconsistencies in the existing interpretations of the WTO
nondiscrimination provisions. The approach is internally coherent and
can be applied consistently to the likeness or similarity determination in
various contexts of WTO law.
It should be noted that this paper is not intended to provide a comprehensive study of all the likeness concepts and all the generally-worded
nondiscrimination clauses contained in the WTO agreements. Most notably, it does not discuss the nondiscrimination provisions of TRIPS, which
operates in a significantly different manner from GATT and GATS.24
Nonetheless, to the extent that a comparison of likeness or similarity
between two objects is inherent in the analysis of any discrimination, the
general approach developed in this paper should be applicable to all
WTO nondiscrimination requirements at the conceptual level.
II.

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

This section provides the analytical framework for this study. Drawing
on the general moral philosophy of equality, it explores the meaning of
the concept of "similarly situated" and its relationship with the notion of
nondiscrimination. It then analyzes how the "similarly situated" paradigm
is reflected in the nondiscrimination cases decided under the equal protection and commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. Following a discussion on the question of standards of review, a generally
formulated approach is proposed for the analysis and determination of
the "likeness" or "similarity" issues under WTO law.
A.

Nondiscrimination and the Concept of "Similarly-Situated"

The notion of treating the similarly-situated similarly is inherent in the
notion of nondiscrimination. Underlying nondiscrimination is the idea of
equality. Equality, however, has never meant the same treatment for all;
24

TRIPS operates by incorporating the norms and rules of a number of major

international agreements on intellectual properties, and the MFN and NT obligations
of TRIPS are subject to certain limits imposed by these other agreements. Unlike
MFN and NT under GAT and GATS which are accorded to "like products" and
"like services" or "like service suppliers" of the Members, the TRIPS MFN and NT
are granted to "nationals" of the Members. See TRIPS, supra note 4, arts. 3 and 4. For
discussion on the relationship between the NT obligation of TRIPS Article 3.1 and
that of GATT Article 111:4, see Panel Report, European Communities-Protectionof
Trademarks and GeographicIndicationsfor Agricultural Productsand Foodstuffs, I
7.181-7.187, 7.241-7.248, WT/DS290/R (March 15, 2005) (adopted Apr. 20, 2005)
[hereafter EC-Trademarks/GIs (Australia)];Panel Report, European CommunitiesProtection of Trademarks and Geographic Indications for Agricultural Products and
Foodstuffs, 1$ 7.131-7.137, 7.205-7.212, WT/DS174/R (March 15, 2005) (adopted Apr.
20, 2005) [hereafter EC-Trademarks/GIs (U.S.)].
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instead, equality consists in the like treatment of all similarly situated persons. It is a deeply-rooted moral principle in Western thought that it is
just to treat the equals equally and to treat the unequals unequally.25
Accordingly, the question almost never rests in whether the similarly situated should be treated equally, but how to classify the equals or the similarly-situated.
Rather than invoking the language of equal treatment for the similarlysituated, the notion of nondiscrimination is often expressed in the form of
a comparative right, that is, a right that is determined by reference to the
status of another.2 6 For example, "X is entitled to whatever benefits Y
receives." This formula prescribes equal or nondiscriminatory treatment
between X and Y by defining X's right to be the same as Y's. The MFN
and NT clauses in GATT Articles 1:1 and III are such formulations of
comparative rights. Under the MFN clause, the product of a WTO Member is entitled to receive any advantage, favor, privilege or immunity that
one Member grants to the like product of any other country with respect
to tariffs and other matters of importation and exportation. In effect, the
MFN clause prescribes all WTO Members to be in the same class, or
similarly situated, with respect to their like products for the purpose of
tariffs and other treatment. In the same vein, the NT clauses prescribe
imported products and like domestic products to be in the same class, or
similarly situated, with respect to matters of internal taxation and regulation. Thus, when a rule of nondiscrimination is expressed in the form of a
comparative right, it mandates that the right holders should be deemed as
similarly situated with, and therefore be given the same treatment as, the
person or object used as reference. 7
According to Aristotle, for example, "[e]quality consists in the same treatment
of similar persons." See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. VII. ch. 14 (Stephen Everson
ed., Cambridge University Press 1988). "[B]uilding upon prior work by Plato,"
Aristotle also said "three things about equality that have influenced Western thought
ever since: (1) It is just to treat people who are equal equally. (2) It is also just to treat
people who are unequal unequally. (3) The foregoing propositions are self-evident,
being 'universally accepted even without the support of argument."' See PETER
25

WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RHETORICAL FORCE OF

"EQUALITY' IN MORAL AND LEGAL DISCOURSE 185 (Princeton University Press 1990)
(footnote omitted).
26 In contrast, a non-comparative right, for example, the right of a person to the
privacy of his or her home, is a right that can be determined without reference to the
status of another. See id. at 131.
27 The notion of nondiscrimination or treating the similarly-situated alike is also
implicit in all substantive rules expressed in a non-comparative form. For example,
consider a rule that states: "Every citizen who is 18 years or older and is otherwise
eligible shall have the right to vote." Under this rule, all persons meeting the
citizenship, age and other eligibility requirements are treated as a similarly situated
group, and all other persons as differently situated from that group. In this sense, a
generally applicable rule, as opposed to an ad hoc rule applicable only to a specific
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Conceptually, the notion of nondiscrimination or treating the similarlysituated alike involves treatment accorded to two groups of recipients. In
order to determine whether discrimination exists, it is necessary to make
two comparisons: a comparison between the treatment accorded to the
two groups so as to ascertain whether there is a disparity in treatment
between them; and a comparison between the two groups of recipients so
as to determine whether they are "similarly situated." For example, in the
context of GATT MIEN obligations, a violation occurs only when (a)
there is a disparity in treatment of the products of two Members, and (b)
the products of the two Members are "like products," i.e., they are similarly situated. In practice, identifying a disparity between the treatment
accorded to the two groups does not seem to pose much of a problem,
although de facto disparate treatment can be difficult to identify. 28 Determining whether the two groups are similarly situated, on the other hand,
has proven to be much more complex. The focus of this study is on the
comparison between the two groups of recipients. Nonetheless, to the
extent that the purpose of comparing the treatment accorded to different
recipients is to determine the likeness of such treatment, the analytical
approach developed in this paper should be equally valid for that
comparison.
B.

The Key to the Concept of Similarity: Relevant Criteriafor
Comparison

The term "similarly-situated" derives from the concept of similarity.
The concept of similarity implies that two or more objects are being compared by a common standard and judged as indistinguishable in relevant
respects. Although the concept of similarity presupposes a standard of
comparison, it does not itself prescribe particular standards. Instead, it
operates by reference to whatever standard is appropriate or relevant to
the purpose at hand.2 9 A relevant standard for one purpose may be irrelevant for another. For instance, most people would describe nectarines
and peaches as similar fruits when they use shape, size, color, texture, and
taste of fruits as standards of comparison. For a student of language wishing to compare the names of fruits, these standards would be irrelevant;
person or object, requires, and (if faithfully applied) results in, nondiscrimination. It
has been argued, however, that equality in its true sense can only be meaningfully
understood as a claim about comparative rights. See Christopher J. Peters, Equality
Revisited, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1223 (1997).
21 See Lothar Ehring, De Facto Discriminationin World Trade Law: National and
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment - or Equal Treatment? 36 J. WORLD TRADE 921
(2002). For an example of possible ways of comparing treatment accorded to different
groups under NT obligations, see Panel Report, EC-Trademarks/GIs (Australia),
supra note 24, 1$ 7.206-7.240; Panel Report, EC-Trademarks/GIs (U.S.), supra note
24,
7.152-7.153, 7.172-7.204.
29 Westen, supra note 25, at 31.

224

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:215

instead he might distinguish the fruits on the basis of their phonetics or
orthography, and conclude that nectarine is similar to "mandarin" but not
at all similar to "peach."3 °
The key to the concept of similarity, therefore, lies in the relevant criteria for comparison. To declare persons or things to be similar, one must
first possess a suitable standard or criterion of comparison. A criterion is
suitable when it is "conducive to or useful or instrumental in furthering
some state of affairs one wishes to bring about."'" Whether a particular
consideration furthers a given goal, and hence is relevant, is mostly a matter of factual evaluation, whereas whether something ought to be a goal is
a matter of normative decision.3 2 The nexus between a given goal and the
criteria for comparison used in furthering it, i.e., the degree of relevance
of such criteria to the goal, may range from that of necessity to that of a
reasonable connection. If a factor is deemed indispensable in furthering
the given goal, the consideration of that factor will be necessary in the
similarity judgment since no meaningful comparison can be made without
that consideration. On the other hand, if a factor is merely conducive to
or useful in furthering the goal, then whether to allow such factor to be
used as a criterion in the similarity judgment becomes a normative
question.3 3
Applying this conception to law, one can come to the following propositions. First, what nondiscrimination requires is that like treatment be
extended to all that are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of a
given rule. Whether persons or things are similarly situated cannot be
determined meaningfully by neutral or "objective" standards. Instead, it
must be determined by reference to the purpose of the particular rule
under which a classification is made. Second, a criterion for classification
is relevant only when it serves to further the goal of the particular rule. If
the criterion does not further the goal, it is irrelevant and should not be
used. The connection between the criterion and the asserted goal of the
rule should at least be reasonable. Third, unless a criterion for classification is indispensable in furthering the goal of the rule, in which case it
must be used, whether to allow a relevant criterion for classification is a
normative decision of the court. The court may consider norms and values extrinsic to the immediate purpose of the particular rule in deciding
whether to permit a useful but not indispensable factor to be the basis for
classification. Fourth, the question of whether the purpose of a given rule
30

Id.

31 Id.
32

at 120-21.

Id. at 121.

33 Westen does not seem to distinguish different levels of relevance when he stated
that the "further question whether something ought to be a goal, and whether
considerations ought to be allowed in furtherance of it, are normative questions." Id.
(emphasis original).
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is appropriate or legitimate entails a normative decision that can only be
made in light of a norm beyond the framework of classification itself.3 4
- Examples from United States Law

The above propositions find support in United States law which, with
its common law tradition, provides a rich source of jurisprudence on nondiscrimination. Although the cases discussed below concern the nondiscrimination requirements of U.S. constitutional law, the approaches
taken by U.S. courts in interpreting these requirements reflect a collective understanding of U.S. jurists on the conceptual truth of the notion of
treating the similarly-situated similarly that should transcend any particular jurisdiction.
A major source of nondiscrimination jurisprudence is U.S. equal protection law. In cases involving alleged violations of the equal protection
requirements of the U.S. Constitution, the courts are directed to examine
whether a challenged classification serves to advance the legitimate purposes of the law containing such classification or is otherwise justified by
a legitimate governmental interest. For example, in a case challenging a
state statute banning the use of plastic non-refillable milk containers but
permitting the use of paperboard non-refillable containers, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the different treatment of the two types of milk
containers did not violate the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution because the ban was rationally related to the statute's legitimate
objectives of encouraging conservation and reducing solid waste.3 5
Although both kinds of containers were non-refillable and might pose the
same overall environmental harm, the Court accepted the arguments
that plastic containers create more volume of solid waste than paperboard ones, and that the ban on plastic containers would help conserve
energy because the plastic was made from a nonrenewable resource
whereas the paperboard was made from renewable forest products.36
Based on these and other factors,3 7 the Court was satisfied that the two
types of containers were not similarly situated with respect to the asserted
purposes of the statute.
By comparison, the Court has struck down classifications that it found
to be irrelevant to the stated purposes of the law requiring such classifica14 Indeed, without the ability to judge the appropriateness or legitimacy of the
purpose of the rule itself, judicial review of the classification contained in the rule
would become "an exercise in tautological reasoning." Nordlingerv. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1,
34 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981).
36 Id. at 468-69.
37 The other arguments accepted by the Court were that elimination of the popular
plastic jug would encourage the use of environmentally superior containers, and that
the ban on plastic containers which had only recently been introduced would reduce
the economic dislocation foreseen from the movement toward greater use of
environmentally superior containers. Id. at 465-66.
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tions or to any legitimate government interest. For example, in a case
challenging a federal food stamp statute that excluded households containing unrelated persons from eligibility for federal food assistance, the
Court held that this eligibility standard violated the equal protection
requirement of the Constitution because it was irrelevant to the stated
purposes of the statute and was not rationally related to furthering any
legitimate government interest.3 1 The stated purposes of the challenged
statute were to raise national levels of nutrition among low-income
households and to stimulate the agricultural economy. 39 The Court found
that the classification contained in the statute was irrelevant to its stated
purposes because the relationships among members of the households
had nothing to do with their personal nutritional requirements or their
abilities to stimulate agricultural economy.4 ° To the extent that the legislation was intended to prevent "hippie communes" from participating in
the food stamp program, the Court held that such a desire to harm a
politically unpopular group could not constitute a legitimate governmental interest.4 ' In another case, the Court held that a Texas city zoning
ordinance requiring a special permit for operating a group home for the
mentally retarded violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.4" The Court reasoned that while the mentally retarded as a group
are different from others not sharing their misfortune, this difference is
irrelevant since there was no showing that the proposed group home
would threaten the city's legitimate interests in a way that other permitted uses would not.4 3 Thus, under the Court's ruling, absent the showing
of any legitimate governmental interest, the city zoning law must not treat
the mentally-retarded as differently situated from others.
Another major source of nondiscrimination jurisprudence is developed
under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution, which the Supreme
Court has interpreted as prohibiting the several states from enacting legislation that discriminates against interstate commerce unless it can be
justified by a legitimate local interest. 44 The purpose or rationale of the
38

U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

39 Id. at 533-34.

Id. at 534.
Id. at 534. In addition, the Court also rejected the government's argument that
the challenged classification was useful in preventing fraud in the food stamp
program. See id. at 536-38.
42 City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
43 Id. at 448.
4 The commerce clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, §8, grants the power to regulate
interstate and foreign commerce to U.S. Congress. Although the commerce clause
does not mention the nondiscrimination principle explicitly, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that in the absence of Congressional legislation, the commerce
clause imposes limits on the power of state to regulate interstate and foreign
commerce and that such limits include nondiscrimination against out-of-state
economic interests and interstate commerce. See e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275,
40
41
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nondiscrimination requirement is to prevent state economic protectionism and ensure the free flow of commerce in the nation.4 5 Although the
Court has not been particularly clear in defining "discrimination" under
the commerce clause,4 6 its decisions can generally be understood in terms
of the similarly-situated analysis proposed above. When state legislation
is challenged under the commerce clause, it is typically accused of discriminating against interstate commerce or out-of-state economic interests in favor of local commerce or in-state economic interests. The
question then is whether the disfavored (interstate or out-of-state) interest is similarly situated with the favored in-state interest with respect to
the legitimate purpose of the state legislation.
Given the anti-protectionist objective of the commerce clause, a legitimate purpose of the state law must be something other than the protection of local economic interests. In practice, a challenged state law can
almost always proffer purposes other than simple economic protectionism; examples of such purposes include public health, environmental or
consumer protection, social (as opposed to economic) welfare of citizens,
and other areas in which the state power to regulate is legitimate.4 7 The
280-82 (1875); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523-27 (1935); City of
Philadelphiav. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24 (1978). The doctrine based on the
Court's interpretation of the commerce clause is commonly known as the "dormant
commerce clause" or the "negative implications" of the commerce clause. For a
history of the dormant commerce clause, see Laurence H. Tribe, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 6-2 - 6-5 (3d ed., West Publishing Company 2000). See
generally, Robert A. Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State
Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of ConstitutionalStructure, 31 WAYNE
L. REv. 885 (1985).
45 See Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527 (stating that the ultimate principle of the commerce
clause is "that one state in its dealings with another may not place itself in a position
of economic isolation" and that the state power may not be used "with the aim and
effect of establishing an economic barrier against competition with the products of
another state or the labor of its residents."); Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624 (stating
"where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per
se rule of invalidity has been erected").
46 See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401, 1412-15
(1994) (distinguishing three types cases under the dormant commerce clause: (a)
those involving state measures that are explicitly origin-based, (b) those involving
facially origin-neutral measures that have "discriminatory" effects on interstate
commerce, and (c) those involving facially origin-neutral measures that impose
merely "incidental" burdens on interstate commerce; and pointing out that the courts
have not developed a clear test to distinguish the two types of facially neutral
measures and that they often simply pronounce that a state statute is or is not
"discriminatory.")
47 See e.g., Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 523 (the State of New York asserting sanitary
security of milk supply as the purpose of its law that prohibited the sale of milk
imported from another state unless the price paid in the other state met the minimum
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real question, therefore, is whether the distinction effected by the state
law between the in-state and out-of-state interests serves to further such
asserted purposes. The Court will strike down the state law if it finds the
distinction effected by that law between the in-state and out-of-state
interests does not serve or is not necessary to achieve its asserted purposes. Conversely, it will uphold the state law if it finds the in-state and
out-of-state distinction effected by that law serves or is necessary to further its legitimate purposes.
For example, the Court struck down as unconstitutional a New Jersey
statute that prohibited the importation of waste generated outside its territory, despite the asserted legislative purposes of the statute being to
protect the State's environment, public health, safety, and welfare.4 8 The
Court held that whatever the purpose of the statute, "it may not be
accomplished by discriminating against articles of commerce coming from
outside the State unless there is some reason, apart from their origin, to
treat them differently. '' 49 Since New Jersey could not prove that the waste
generated outside the State was more harmful to environment or public
health and safety than that generated inside the State (i.e., that out-ofstate waste is differently situated from the in-state waste with respect to
the purposes of the statute), the distinction drawn by the statute between
the two kinds of waste does not serve the asserted purposes of the law
and is therefore invalid. In contrast, the Court upheld a Maine statute
prohibiting the importation of live baitfish into the State of Maine,
because it was satisfied that there was substantial scientific uncertainty
surrounding the effects that non-native baitfish parasites could have on
Maine's wild fish population and that there were no available nondiscriminatory alternatives to the ban.5" Here, the Court recognized that Maine
had a legitimate purpose to protect the State's unique fisheries, and the
distinction drawn between native and nonnative live baitfish was necessary to further this legitimate purpose.5 1
The same analysis applies to cases in which the challenged state law
does not explicitly discriminate against out-of-state interests but has an
adverse impact on interstate commerce. For example, the Court struck
down a local order prohibiting a company from shipping its Arizonagrown cantaloupes outside Arizona unless they were packed inside the
state and marked as of Arizona origin.52 The order was issued under a
price for purchases from local producers) See infra notes 48 to 65 and accompanying
text for further examples of local laws with asserted purposes of environmental
protection, consumer protection, and protection of public health, safety, and social
welfare.
48 Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
49 Id. at 626-27.
50 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
51 Id. at 151-52.
52 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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state statute requiring all cantaloupes grown in Arizona to be packed in a
manner approved by the state.53 The primary purpose of the statute was
to prohibit deceptive packaging so as to promote and preserve the reputation of Arizona growers. 4 The Court recognized the legitimacy of the
purpose of the law, but found the local order did not serve that purpose
since the company was not putting the good name of Arizona on an inferior or deceptive packaged product - the cantaloupes grown by the company were of a superior quality and were packed in California and bore
the name of their California packer. 55 The drawing of a distinction
between the company, an out-of-state packer, and in-state packers in this
case was irrelevant to the asserted purpose of the State law but imposed
an undue burden on interstate commerce. 5 6 Similarly, the Court struck
down a North Carolina statute requiring all apples sold in closed containers in that state either to display the applicable grade approved by the
federal system or to bear a no-grade label. 57 An effect of the statute was
to deprive the competitive advantage of the apples produced in Washington State which had developed an inspection and grading system that was
considered in the industry to be superior to the federal system.5 8 The
declared purpose of the statute was to protect consumers from deception
and confusion caused by multiple grading in the marketplace.5 9 However,
the Court found that the challenged statute did "remarkably little to further that laudable goal at least with respect to Washington apples," since
the statute magnified the problem of consumer confusion by depriving
consumers of all information concerning the quality of apples, and since
the superior Washington grades could only "deceive" or "confuse" a consumer to his benefit.6" In this case, a facially origin-neutral law had the
effect of disadvantaging out-of-state producers in favor of the interest of
local competitors, and the distinction effected by the law between the
treatment of out-of-state producers and that of local producers was irrelevant to its asserted purpose. 61 In comparison, the Court held a local ordiat 142.
54 Id. at 143.
53 Id.

55 Id. at 143-44.
56 The Court further addressed the argument that Arizona had a legitimate interest
to require that interstate cantaloupe purchasers be informed that this high quality
fruit was grown in Arizona, and found that such state interest was so "tenuous" that it
could not constitutionally justify the burden the order imposed on interstate
commerce by requiring the company to build a new packing plant in Arizona when
the company could operate the business more efficiently elsewhere. See id. at 145.
57 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
58

Id. at 351.

59 Id. at 352-53.
60

Id. at 353-54.

61 This case is an example where the comparison of similarity is made between the

de facto treatment accorded to two groups of recipients rather than between the two
groups. See supra Section II.A, first paragraph. The case can also be viewed, however,
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nance prohibiting door-to-door solicitation for national magazines as
valid under the commerce clause even though the ban had the effect of
favoring local retail merchants over out-of-state solicitors.62 The Court
found that the purpose of the ordinance was to protect the privacy of
local residents, which was a legitimate exercise of the state power, 63 and
the distinction effected by the ordinance between the solicitors and other
vendors served to advance that legitimate purpose. In other words, the
out-of-state solicitors and the in-state vendors were deemed as dissimilarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the local law. Likewise, the Court upheld a facially origin-neutral law of Minnesota banning
the use of plastic non-refillable milk containers while permitting paperboard non-refillable milk containers, despite the fact that all the producers of plastic resin were from outside the state and that pulpwood is a
major in-state industry.6 4 The Court recognized the legitimacy of the
asserted purposes of the state law as encouraging conservation and reducing solid waste, and found that the distinction drawn by the state law
between the plastic and paperboard containers served rationally to further that legitimate purpose. 65 Thus, the two types of containers were
deemed as dissimilarly situated with respect to the purpose of the state
law and no discrimination was found under the commerce clause.
The above examples from U.S. law provide us with empirical evidence
of how the notion of nondiscrimination, or treating the similarly situated
similarly, is understood and applied under U.S. constitutional law. There
are, of course, major differences between the U.S. and WTO legal systems that may affect their respective tribunals' approach to interpreting
the notion of nondiscrimination. For one thing, the WTO system is
strictly based on treaty provisions. WTO agreements contain specific
forms of nondiscrimination requirements, such as MFN and NT obligations, and provide certain specific grounds that may be used to justify a
departure from them, such as those set out in GATT Article XX and
GATS Article XIV. WTO tribunals are charged with the mission to "clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law" and their
"clarification" of the treaty language "cannot add to or diminish" the
rights and obligations provided in those agreements.6 6 In contrast, the
nondiscrimination requirements and possible justifications for departure
as one in which the same de jure treatment was accorded to Washington apples and
local apples that are differently situated with respect to the asserted purpose of the
state law, since Washington apples have superior grades that cannot create consumer
confusion or deception targeted by the state law whereas the local apples might.
62 See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 640 (1951).
63 Id. at 640.
64 Clover, 449 U.S. at 474.
65 See supra text at notes 35 and 36.
66 DSU, supra note 5, art. 3.2.
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from them under the equal protection and commerce clauses of the U.S.
Constitution are largely open-ended. As a result, U.S. courts may have
considerably more leeway than WTO tribunals in deciding what criteria
for drawing a distinction between two groups are permissible in a given
case.6" Nonetheless, such systemic differences, while important to keep in
mind, should not detract from the reference value of the general analytical approach developed under U.S. law for defining nondiscrimination.
That is so because the reference value of the relevant U.S. case law lies in
its illustration of how, as a conceptual matter, the purposes (asserted or
actual) of a challenged law should relate to the basis for determining the
"similarly situated."
C. The Question of Standards of Review
A closely related but conceptually separate issue in defining nondiscrimination is that of the standard of judicial review. As noted above,
except in cases where drawing a distinction between two groups does not
serve the asserted purpose of the rule at all, the connection between a
classification and the asserted purpose of the rule containing that classification is a matter of degree. Whether to recognize that purpose as legitimate, and whether to allow a particular classification that is useful (but
not indispensable) in advancing a legitimate purpose, are matters of normative judgment. In making such judgment, the judiciary is expected to
be guided by norms and values that are deemed important for the system.
One normative issue that inevitably arises in the process is how much
deference the judiciary should give to the legislature or government body
that adopts a challenged classification. The higher the level of deference,
the less likely the court is to invalidate the classification as violative of the
norm of nondiscrimination.
It is again useful to refer to the U.S. experiences. The levels of judicial
deference are translated into different standards of review under U.S.
law. For example, under the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court has articulated different standards of review to
the challenged classification depending on the constitutional importance
of the particular individual rights involved. Under this approach, all racebased classification is "suspect" and is subject to "strict scrutiny" under
the "compelling governmental interest" standard of review, which means
that all race-based classification will be held unconstitutional unless it can
On the other hand, it has been pointed out that, just as there are alternative
judicial approaches to statutory interpretation in the United States, ranging from
67

restrained textualism, to originalism, to an active, dynamic approach, WTO tribunals
have at their disposal alternative approaches to interpreting WTO agreements.
Richard H. Steinberg, JudicialLawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,and
Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 247, 258 (2004). Also, there has been a
growing concern that the AB has engaged in expansive lawmaking or judicial
activism. See generally, id.
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be shown to be precisely tailored to advancing a compelling government
interest.68 Gender-based classification receives a considerable degree of
scrutiny under the "important and substantial relationship" standard of
review, meaning that a gender-based classification will be invalidated
unless it can be shown to be substantially related to the advancement of
an "important governmental interest."6 9 In comparison, classification
based on most other grounds, including most social and economic rights,
is evaluated under the less restrictive "rational basis" standard of review,
under which the challenged classification will be upheld so long as it is
rationally related to the advancement of a "legitimate governmental
interest."7 Thus, under the equal protection clause, the more constitutionally important the affected individual right is, 7 ' the less deferential
the Court will be to the governmental interests adopting the challenged
classification.
The Court has also applied different levels of scrutiny to state laws
challenged under the commerce clause. In general, a state law that is
facially discriminatory, i.e., drawing a distinction explicitly on the basis of
state origin, is subject to "strict scrutiny," which means that the challenged law will be invalidated unless the state can prove that the originbased distinction is necessary to advance a legitimate state interest.7 2 By
comparison, a state law that is facially origin-neutral but adversely affects
interstate commerce will receive a lesser degree of scrutiny, which means
that the distinction drawn by the law will be upheld if it is rationally
related to the legitimate purpose of the state law.7 3 The Court has articulated the general rule applicable to reviewing facially-neural state laws as
a matter of balancing the burden imposed on interstate commerce against
the legitimate local interests.7" Given that the purpose of the commerce
68 See Robert Sedler, United States, Constitutional Law in INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAWS (Supp. 40)
311-314 (R. Blanpain ed., Kluwer Law
International 2005).
69 Id.
321-322.
70 Id. 375; see also Clover, 449 U.S. at 470; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534; Cleburne,
473 U.S. at 446.
71 The level of importance assigned to an individual right is determined by the
norms and values that are considered important for the U.S. legal system. Hence,
given the history of racial discrimination in the American society, preventing racial
discrimination is given the highest level of importance under the equal protection
clause. See Sedler, supra note 68, 311.
72 See e.g., Philadelphia,437 U.S. at 627-28; Maine, 477 U.S. at 151-52.
13 See e.g., Clover, 449 U.S. at 471-72; Breard, 341 U.S. at 640. Cf., In Pike and
Hunt, the distinction drawn by the challenged law was not rationally related to its
asserted purpose of the state law. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 144-45; Hunt, 432 U.S. at 35354 (noting that the challenged statute did "remarkably little" to further its asserted
goal).
74 Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (stating "[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are
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clause is to prevent state economic protectionism, the Court is the least
deferential to (or most suspicious of) the asserted interest of the local
government when the challenged distinction is explicitly based on the
state origin, and is most deferential when the measure is facially originneutral, serves to advance a legitimate local interest and does not impose
an undue burden on interstate commerce.
In the context of the WTO, a similar issue of deference arises whenever
a WTO tribunal is called upon to decide whether a particular classification drawn by an individual Member is permissible under the WTO
Agreement. Strictly speaking, the issue of deference, or standards of judicial review, is present in every WTO dispute settlement case, since WTO
tribunals must decide in each case how intensively the challenged measure should be scrutinized. As in the U.S. legal setting, the level of deference paid by a WTO tribunal to the decision of a Member government
directly affects the outcome of a WTO dispute. Despite the critical importance of this issue, WTO dispute settlement procedures do not contain
explicit standards of review except for those arising under the Antidumping Agreement. 5 Although the issue has been discussed from time to
time in various disputes, few clearly articulated standards of review have
emerged from WITO case law. 76 The lack of clearly articulated standards
of review, however, does not mean that WTO tribunals do not employ
standards of review in deciding cases. Instead, it merely means that the
only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... And the extent of the
burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on
interstate activities.")
75 The Antidumping Agreement, supra note 5, art. 17.6.
76 The AB has held that for all WTO agreements other than the Antidumping
Agreement, the appropriate standard of review for panels is set out in Article 11 of
DSU, which requires a panel to "make an objective assessment of the matter before
it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of
and conformity with the relevant covered agreement." Appellate Body Report,
Argentina-Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear, T 118, WT/DS121/AB[R
(Dec. 14, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Argentina-Footwear]. The
"objective assessment" standard is neither one of de novo review, nor of "total
deference." Appellate Body Report, EC-Measures Affecting Meat and Meat Products
(Hormones), T 117, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) (adopted Feb.
13, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones]. This articulation of the standard of review for
panels based on DSU Article 11, however, is too general to serve as a useful guide in
specific cases. See Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Nicolas Lockhart, Standardof Review
in WTO Law, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 491 (2004) (recognizing the need for developing
appropriate standards of review for different subject matters under WTO law);
Matthias Oesch, Standards of Review in WTO Dispute Resolution, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L.
635 (2003) (concluding that panels and the AB had generally paid little deference to
Members' interpretation of the WTO agreements).
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tribunals apply, deliberately or not, certain implicit standards that may
not be readily discernible.
A fundamental normative question facing WTO tribunals is how to balance "the values of international coordination" on the one hand, and "the
values of preserving national sovereign authority" on the other.7 7 As the
Appellate Body indicated, the appropriate standard of review should
reflect the balance established in the relevant agreement "between the
jurisdictional competence conceded by the Members to the WTO and the
jurisdictional competences retained by the Members for themselves."7 8
The normative question is answered, and the balance between the authority of the WTO and the authority of the Members is drawn, in every
WTO dispute settlement decision with or without an explicitly stated
standard of review.
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to study the subject, the
author believes that the question of standards of review is practically
intertwined with the issue of defining discrimination under WTO law.
And the question looms large when the tribunal must make its normative
judgment whether an asserted purpose of a challenged classification is
legitimate and whether the classification that is merely conducive to serving a legitimate purpose is permissible. Therefore, an effort will be made
in this paper to ascertain the standards of review applied by the tribunals
in the relevant cases and to analyze the effect of such application on the
outcomes of the cases where appropriate.
D. Defining Nondiscrimination under WTO Law: Developing an
Analytical Approach
Drawing on the conceptual analysis and U.S. experiences introduced
above, and keeping in mind the strictly treaty-based nature of WTO obligations, we may develop an analytical approach to assist in the interpretation of the nondiscrimination requirements under WTO law. Such an
approach is needed in interpreting the inherently ambiguous term "nondiscrimination" where no specific criterion of classification of different
groups is provided in the treaty language. And it is also needed when a
WTO rule calls for a decision on likeness, such as "like products" or "like
services" under the MFN and NT clauses, or like (or the "same" or "similar") conditions under GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV, where
likeness is not defined.
Conceptually, the proposed approach consists of the following steps:
first, identifying the purpose or goal of the WTO provision under which a
77 See generally Steven P. Croley and John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures,
Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 193,
212 (April 1996) (also pointing out that the various arguments justifying a high level
of judicial deference to government agencies under the U.S. administrative law do not
fare well in the WTO setting).
78 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76,
115.
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classification effected by a Member's measure is challenged as discriminatory; second, identifying the criteria of classification that are relevant to
furthering that goal; and third, determining whether the challenged classification is consistent with the relevant criteria. Because the degree of relevance of a particular criterion to the goal of the WTO provision may
range from that of necessity to that of a tenuous connection, it is necessary to set a certain standard for the required level of relevance under the
particular WTO provision. Evidently, if a criterion does not help to further the goal, it is irrelevant and should not be used. Conversely, if a
criterion is indispensable for achieving that goal, it must be used. For a
criterion that falls somewhere in between the two ends of the spectrum,
whether to use it becomes a normative decision. In making such a normative decision, the WTO tribunal may consider and balance among various
values, including the values of international coordination versus preservation of national autonomy, liberal trade versus non-trade norms recognized by the WTO Agreement, and the need to strengthen a rule-based
WTO system versus the need for efficiency and efficacy in resolving particular trade disputes which may call for flexibility and pragmatism. This
decision-making process inevitably involves the application of a certain
standard of review, whether or not articulated explicitly.
In practice, it may not always be feasible to identify all the permissible
criteria of classification under a particular WTO provision in advance.
For example, when a challenged classification is effected by a Member's
measure falling within one of the policy exceptions, such as an environmental measure under GATT Article XX(g), it may be impossible, as
well as undesirable, for the WTO tribunals to predetermine a set of permissible criteria of classification since the measures covered by a broad
79
policy exception can be too diverse to warrant a uniform set of criteria.
In such cases, the question becomes whether the purpose of the challenged measure effecting the classification is permissible under the relevant WTO provision. If it is not, the classification should be invalidated.
If it is, then the tribunal needs to evaluate whether the classification
serves to advance that permissible purpose. Again, if the classification
does not further that purpose, it is irrelevant and should not be allowed; if
the classification is useful, but not indispensable, in advancing that purpose, whether to allow it is a matter of normative decision.
The above proposed approach is clearly purpose-oriented. It is so for
the simple reason that whether two groups (e.g., products or countries)
are similarly situated and therefore should be treated alike cannot be
determined meaningfully without reference to the purpose for which they
are compared. There are, however, a number of questions regarding
"purpose" that require further explanation.
First, is it feasible for a WTO tribunal to identify the purpose of a particular WTO provision? In interpreting WTO provisions, the panels and
19 See infra Section IV.A.3.
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the AB are guided by the general rule of interpretation set out in Article
31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,"0 which states: "A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of a treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose."8 " Although the "object and purpose"
referred to in Article 31 apparently means that of a treaty as a whole, the
AB has from time to time examined the object and purpose of a particular WTO provision. 2 Seeking the object and purpose of a particular provision is often necessary to ascertain the meaning of the provision since
the object and purpose of a relevant treaty is typically expressed in broad
terms in its preamble and is difficult to apply meaningfully to a particular
provision. 3 Furthermore, a relevant WTO agreement may contain multiple objectives, some of which may not be directly applicable to a particular provision. Of course, the object and purpose of a particular provision
identified by the WTO tribunal must reflect, and be consistent with, one
or more of the wider objects and purposes of the relevant WTO
agreement.8 4
Second, when a WTO tribunal inquires into the purpose or policy goal
of a Member's measure effecting a classification, should the tribunal
accept the purpose asserted by the Member (either declared in advance
or explained post hoc) or determine independently what the true purpose
of the measure is? The first approach was apparently adopted by the U.S.
courts in the cases illustrated above. Upon taking the asserted purposes
80

The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31(1), May 22, 1969, 1155

U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter the Vienna Convention]. It has been established that
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention forms part of the "customary rules of
interpretation of public international law" that WTO tribunals are directed by Article
3.2 of DSU to apply in clarifying the provisions of WTO agreements. See Appellate
Body Report, United States-Standardsfor Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline,
17, WTIDS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996) (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter
U.S.-Gasoline].
81 The Vienna Convention, supra note 80, art. 31(1).
82 For example, Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 17-18, 22
("the purpose and object of Article III:4," and "the purpose and object of the
introductory clause of Article XX"); Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra
note 21, at 19 ('"the purpose and object of Article 111:2"); Appellate Body Report,
EC-Hormones,supra note 76, 177 ("the purpose and object of Article 3" of the SPS
Agreement); Appellate Body Report, Argentina -Footwear, supra note 76, 91 ("the
object and purpose of Article XIX"). For a detailed analysis, see Michael Lennard,
Navigating By the Stars: Interpretingthe WTO Agreements, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 28
(2002).
83 Lennard, supra note 82. It has been pointed out, however, that in the
interpretation of a particular provision the AB has favored "ordinary meaning" of the
term over consideration of its "context and "object and purpose." See Steinberg,
supra note 67, at 261.
84 Lennard, supra note 82.
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of a challenged classification at their face value, the courts applied the
appropriate standard of review to scrutinize whether such purposes were
permissible, and whether the classification served to advance a permissible purpose. This approach has the obvious advantage of being simple to
use, as it does not require the court to determine whether the asserted
purpose is the true purpose or intent of a challenged law, which can be a
complicated and difficult task. The potential disadvantage of the
approach is that it may let the government get away with a problematic
classification when the applicable standard of scrutiny is at the level of a
mere "rational" connection. In the WTO setting, it appears that depending on the specific WTO provision involved, the tribunals may take either
the first (asserted purpose) or second (actual purpose) approach in identifying the purpose of a challenged measure. For example, the AB has
unequivocally adopted the actual purpose approach when examining a
challenged classification of products under GATT Article 111,85 but has
generally accepted the asserted policy objectives of the Members when
assessing their consistency with the policy grounds explicitly permitted
under GATT Article XX.86 Whether the purpose identified by the tribunal is the actual or asserted one, however, such purpose has to be judged
as permissible and the challenged classification has to serve that permissible purpose (meeting a required degree of relevance) to be valid.
Third, what if the relevant WTO provision or the Member's measure
under review has multiple purposes? The multi-purpose situation may
occur with a Member measure because such a measure is often part of
broader social and economic legislation charged with multiple policy
objectives that may or may not point in the same direction. In comparison, WTO agreements are concerned with relatively few objectives,87 of
which trade liberalization is a primary one, and our focus on the purpose
of particular WTO provisions within a particular WTO agreement may
further narrow the possibility of encountering a multi-purposed situation.
Nonetheless, it is certainly possible for a WTO provision to have more
than one objective, as will be shown below. 88 In such circumstances, it is
up to the tribunal to sort out the principal objective from the lesser ones
and decide which is the most pertinent for the purpose of WTO scrutiny.
The process of such decision is necessarily a normative one, involving
again the application of a chosen standard of review.
See infra notes 137 and 139 and accompanying text.
88 See infra Section IV.A.
87 The Preamble of the WTO Agreement sets out the following general objectives:
raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and steady growth of real
income and effective demand, expanding the production of and trade in goods and
services, seeking sustainable development, promoting economic development of
developing countries, reducing trade barriers, and eliminating discrimination in
international trade relations. See WTO Agreement, supra note 1, pmbl.
88 See infra Section IV.D.2.
85

238

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:215

Lastly, it should be clarified that, although the above-proposed
approach suggests concrete steps to be taken in applying a WTO nondiscrimination requirement, it is not meant to serve as a practice guide.
Instead, the central aim of the proposal is to explore the meaning of
"nondiscrimination" within the WTO context in terms of a "similarly situated" paradigm. That being the goal, the proposed approach provides an
analytical framework for the assessment of the similarity or likeness
issues arising from the WTO context.
III.

THE "SIMILARLY-SITUATED"

CONCEPT WITHIN

MFN

AND

NT

PROVISIONS: LIKE PRODUCTS

Given that the notion of treating the similarly-situated similarly is
inherent in the notion of nondiscrimination, it is no surprise that we
should find that the concept of "similarly situated" lies at the heart of
MEFN and NT obligations, the two primary forms of nondiscrimination
under WTO law. For purposes of GATT MFN and NT clauses, whether
two or more WTO Members are similarly situated, and therefore should
receive the same or similar treatment, is defined by the concept of "like
products." In other words, under GATT MFN and NT provisions, nondiscrimination between WTO Members means treating like products alike,
irrespective of their national origins. The corresponding concept for
GATS MFN and NT obligations is "like services" and "like service suppliers." 9 Given that most of the jurisprudence on likeness concerns products,9 ° this section will focus on the discussion of "like products."
The concept of "like products" is central to the GATT system. It
defines not only the scope of GATT MEN and NT obligations, but also
91
measures, 92 and
the right to trade remedies (antidumping," anti-subsidy
89 It has been suggested that the determination of likeness in the context of
services needs to follow a somewhat different path from that in the context of
products. See Aaditya Mattoo, MFN and the GATS, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND
THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 73 (Petros C.
Mavroidis & Thomas Cottier eds., Patrick Blatter assoc. ed., University of Michigan
Press 2000). For purposes of this study, however, the likeness issue is the same at the
conceptual level in the contexts of products and services.
90 In contrast with the many WTO/GATT cases involving the issue of "like
products," see infra note 95, there have been so far only two WTO cases that
discussed the issue of like services. See Panel Report, European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 7.322, WT/DS27/R (May 22,
1997) (adopted Sept. 25, 1997, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/
R); Panel Report, Canada-CertainMeasures Affecting the Automotive Industry,
10.289, WT/DS139/R, WTIDS142/R (Feb. 11, 2000) (adopted June 19, 2000, as
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS139/AB/R, WT/DS142/AB/R).
1 The concept of "like products" is employed in the definition of dumping under
GATT, supra note 2, art. VI:A, and in the definition of "domestic industry" under the
Antidumping Agreement, supra note 5, art. 4.1. The determination of "like products"
effectively controls the scope of antidumping investigation and duty application. See
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safeguards 93 ). 94 The concept has been examined in a number of GATT
and WTO dispute settlement decisions.95 Since the term "like products"
appears in the text of various WTO agreements, it is incumbent upon
WTO tribunals to interpret the term when the issue arises over a particular classification of products by a Member's measure. To that end, the
tribunals have endeavored to identify specific criteria to be used in determining "like products." The tribunals' jurisprudence has generated much
debate and a considerable body of literature.96
generally Marco Bronckers & Natalie McNelis, Rethinking the "Like Product"
Definition in GATT 1994: Anti-Dumping and Environmental Protection, in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

IN WORLD

TRADE LAW, supra note 89, at 345.
92 Similarly as in the antidumping field, the determination of "like products"
controls the scope of countervailing investigations and application of countervailing
duties. See the SCM Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 11, 15, and 16. The concept of
"like products" also defines "serious prejudice" under Article 6 of the SCM
Agreement, which applies to anti-subsidy actions taken at the WTO dispute
settlement forum.
93 Safeguard measures may be applied only if there is an import surge of the
product that causes serious injury to the domestic industry that produces "like or
directly competitive products." See Safeguard Agreement, supra note 5, arts. 2 and 4.
94 For a list of GATT provisions containing the term "like product," see Appellate
Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting Asbestos and AsbestosContaining Products, 88, WT[DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) (adopted Apr. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter EC-Asbestos]
91 For a list of GATT and WTO decisions addressing the term "like products," see
id. n. 58.
96 Recent studies on likeness include: Robert E. Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints
on National Regulation: Requiem for an "Aim and Effects" Test, in ESSAYS ON THE
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 359 (Cameron May 1999) [hereinafter
Hudec, Aim and Effects]; Robert E. Hudec,"Like Product": The Differences in
Meaning in GATT Articles I and III, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE
OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 89, at 101 [hereinafter
Hudec, Like Product] (n. 1 cites a number of other studies on "like products");
Bronckers & McNelis, supra note 91; William Davey and Joost Pauwelyn, MFN
Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of its Evolution in the
GATT/IWTO Jurisprudencewith ParticularReference to the Issue of "Like Product,"in
REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

IN WORLD

supra note 89, at 13; Mattoo, supra note 89, at 73-75; Petros C.
Mavroidis, "Like Products": Some Thoughts at the Positive and Normative Level, in
TRADE LAW,

REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION

IN WORLD

supra note 89, at 125; Donald H. Regan, Regulatory Purpose and "Like
Product" in Article 111:4 of the GATT (With Additional Remarks on Article III:2),
36(3) J. WORLD TRADE 443 (2002); Amelia Porges & Joel P. Trachtman, Robert
Hudec and Domestic Regulation: The Resurrection of Aim and Effects, 37 J. WORLD
TRADE 783 (2003); Won-Mog Choi, 'LIKE PRODUCTS' IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
LAW: TOWARDS A CONSISTENT GATT/WTO JURISPRUDENCE (Oxford University
Press 2003).
TRADE LAW,
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As a conceptual matter, to ask whether two products are "like" is to
ask whether they are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of
their comparison. As expected, the key issue to the concept of likeness
lies in identifying the relevant criteria for comparison. Hence, in order to
determine whether Japanese shochu and vodka, or a luxury car and an
economy car, or beer of 6% alcohol content and beer of 3% alcohol content, are "like products," one must first know for what purpose they are
compared and then apply criteria that are suitable to further that purpose. The entire issue of what constitute "like products," therefore, can
be approached by applying the "similarly situated" analysis explained
above.
Given the existing jurisprudence on "like products," this section will
focus on two things. First, it will examine a general interpretive position
taken by the AB that the definition of like products should vary depending on the particular WTO provision involved. Second, it will apply the
similarly-situated analysis to assess the "like product" criteria developed
by WTO tribunals under GATT Article III. Although the concept of likeness in Article III has been much studied, it remains a controversial and
perplexing subject in WTO law.
A.

Why should the definition of "like products" vary within the WTO
context?

The Appellate Body has taken a general position on the interpretation
of like products: the definition of likeness varies according to the context
of the WTO provision in which the concept appears.97 It has expressed
that position in a colorful metaphor:
The concept of 'likeness' is a relative one that evokes the image of an
accordion. The accordion of 'likeness' stretches and squeezes in different
places as different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied. The
width of the accordion in any one of those places must be determined by
the particular provision in which the term 'like' is encountered as well as
by the context and the circumstances
that prevail in any given case to
98
which that provision may apply.
While the AB did not explain why the definition of likeness should
vary within the WTO context, its position can be easily understood in
light of the similarly-situated analysis. According to this analysis, whether
two products are like, or similarly situated, cannot be determined meaningfully without reference to the purpose of the provision requiring their
comparison. Consequently, if two provisions containing the concept of
likeness differ in their purposes or policy objectives, their respective criteria for determining likeness, which must advance such purposes, may well
differ, and so will the resulting definitions of likeness under them.
97 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 21.
98

Id.
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It should be noted that to the extent that the various WTO provisions
containing the likeness concept may share the same general goal, such as
promoting liberal trade through protecting competitive conditions of the
market, their likeness criteria may consist of the same factors; but since
each of such provisions is likely to have its distinct and more concrete
purpose within the WTO framework, the furtherance of its specific purpose may require the consideration of separate factors. For example, the
concepts of "like products" and "directly competitive products" appear in
both GATT Article III and Article XIX (safeguard),99 as well as in the
Agreement on Safeguards that clarifies and reinforces the disciplines of
Article XIX.'0 0 While Article III aims at preventing the protection of
domestic producers against imports through internal measures, Article
XIX and the Agreement on Safeguards are designed to allow the protection of domestic producers from imports under certain conditions. To the
extent that these provisions all concern products that are in a competitive
relationship, their respective criteria for determining like products may
comprise common factors, such as physical characteristics and end uses.
However, since the two sets of provisions serve distinct policy objectives,
there is no reason why all of their respective criteria should be the
same.' ° ' A further example can be found in comparing the MEFN clause of
GATT Article 1:1 with the NT clauses of GATT Article III. While these
clauses share similar purposes of nondiscrimination and serve similar
functions of ensuring equal competitive conditions in the market, there
are clear distinctions between their policy goals. Unlike Article III, which
aims at eliminating protection of domestic production through internal
measures, Article I permits protection of domestic production through
tariffs and its goal, therefore, is merely an orderly management of protection.' Such differences in policy objectives between the MFN and NT
provisions may warrant a narrower definition of "like products" under
Article 1:1 than that under Article 111.103

99 See GATT, supra note 2, arts. 111:2 ("like domestic products") and 111:4 ("like
products"); Ad art. III, paragraph 2 ("directly competitive or substitutable product");
and art. XIX:1 ("like or directly competitive products").
100 See Safeguard Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.1 ("like or directly competitive
products").
oI For possible relevant factors in deciding like product under Article 2.1 of the
Safeguard Agreement, see Panel Report, Argentina-SafeguardMeasures on Imports
of Footwear, 8.251, WT/DS121/R (June 25, 1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 2000, as modified
by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS121/AB/R). For factors used in deciding like
product under GATT Article III, see infra Section III.B.
102 See Hudec, Like Product, supra note 96, at 108. Additionally, WTO Members
may utilize classification of products under Article I to deal with the problem of "free
riders" who do not make reciprocal concessions in WTO tariff negotiations. Id. at 109.
103 Id. at 112.
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B.

Criteriafor Defining "Like Products" under GATT Article III:
"Aim and Effects"
1. Background

GATT Article III prohibits the importing Member from using internal
tax or other regulations to disadvantage imported products in favor of
like domestic products. In disputes arising under Article III, the general
issue is whether the importing Member has treated the imported products
less favorably than competing domestic products. The complaining Member would contend that the imported and domestic products are "like
products" and that the imports have been treated less favorably than
their domestic like products, whereas the importing Member would typically argue that the imported and domestic products receiving different
treatment are not "like products" (or, if the products are like, the treatment is not less favorable to the imports).
In resolving these disputes, GATT/WTO tribunals have endeavored to
develop a set of criteria to be used in determining "like products" under
Article III. Traditionally, four factors have been used: physical characteristics, tariff classification, end-uses in a given market, and consumers'
tastes and habits. 10 4 More recently, the tribunals have moved to focus on
the factor of commercial interchangeability or substitutability of the
products, recognizing that a determination of likeness is fundamentally a
determination about "the nature and extent of10a5 competitive relationship" between imported and domestic products.
A major controversy regarding the definition of "like product" is over
the so-called aim-and-effects approach. First developed in the GAT1]
Panel Report in U.S.-Malt Beverages,"°6 the aim-and-effects approach
advocates that in determining "like product" under Article III, one
should consider, in addition to the various other factors, the basic policy
objective of the Article as set out in Article 111:1.107 Article 111:1 states
that internal taxes and other regulatory measures "should not be applied
104

The traditional list of four factors was originally compiled in the Report of the

Working Party adopted on 2 December 1970 on Border Tax Adjustments, GAT
Doc. L/3464. See GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS
[hereinafter B.I.S.D.] (18th Supp.) 97, 101-102 (1972). The Appellate Body quoted the
list with approval. See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 20.
105 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 94,
99 (interpreting "like
products" under Article 111:4). This factor was originally used only in interpreting the
term "a directly competitive or substitutable product" in GATT Ad Article III,
paragraph 2, which supplements the second sentence of Article 111:2.
106 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages,
GATYF Doc. DS23/R (March 16, 1992) (adopted June 19, 1992), B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.)
206 (1993) [hereinafter Panel Report, U.S.-Malt Beverages]. The approach was also
used in the Panel Report in United States-Taxes on Automobiles, GAT Doc. DS31/R
(Oct. 11, 1994) (unadopted).
5.24-5.25.
107 U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 106,
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to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic
production."' 8 In light of this policy objective, the aim-and-effects
approach suggests that "the legitimacy of internal taxes and regulations
should be determined primarily on the basis of their purpose and market
effects, i.e., whether they have a bona fide regulatory purpose and
whether their effect on conditions of competition is to create a protective
advantage in favor of domestic products."' 1 9 Under this approach, a
domestic tax or regulation that treats an imported product less favorably
than a domestic product would not likely be held in violation of Article
III if the measure is shown to have a bona fide (i.e., non-protectionist)
regulatory purpose." The development of this approach is particularly
significant for cases in which the challenged internal measure is originneutral on its face."'
In the view of most commentators, the aim-and-effects approach has
been largely discredited by the Appellate Body." 2 The major cases in
which the AB rejected this approach are Japan-Alcohol,"' which
involves Japanese liquor taxes differentially levied on shochu and vodka
108

GATT,supra note 2, art. 111:1.

109 Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 368.

110 Applying this approach, the Panel in the U.S.-Malt Beverages made two
findings on the issue of like product. The first finding involved a Mississippi wine tax
that differentiated wine according to the type of grape from which the wine was made
and imposed a lower tax on wine made from the type of grape suitable to grow in
Mississippi vineries. Since the United States was unable to demonstrate any bona fide
regulatory purpose for the classification and the tax had the effect to protect domestic
product, the Panel concluded that the two types of wine were "like products" and
should be treated the same. Panel Report, U.S.-Malt Beverages, supra note 106,
5.24-5.26. The second finding concerns several U.S. state regulations imposing more
onerous point-of-sale restrictions on beer with alcohol levels exceeding 3.2 percent.
Since the Panel was able to identify certain social welfare policy and revenue
collection purposes for the state regulations, it concluded that the two kinds of beer
were not like products, and therefore the distinction was valid. Id. 1 5.70-5.77.
111 An internal tax or regulation that treats foreign product less favorably than
domestic product explicitly on the basis of their national origin will be de jure
discriminatory in violation of Article III. There will be a strong presumption in such a
case that the regulatory purpose of the measure is protectionist. See Regan, supra
note 96, at 455-56.
112 See Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96; Davey & Pauwelyn, supra note 96,
at 37-38. One exception is Donald Regan who, while firmly believing in the central
importance of regulatory purpose in like product determination, suggests that a
correcting reading of the AB's opinions in these cases would lead to the conclusion
that the AB has not discredited the aim-and-effects approach. See Donald Regan,
Further Thoughts on the Role of Regulatory Purpose under Article III of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: A Tribute to Bob Hudec, 37 J. WORLD TRADE 737
(2003).
113 See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21.
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and certain other imported products, and EC-Bananas,"4 a case involving the EC's preferential treatment of domestic producers in the issuance
of certain import licenses for bananas. In these decisions, the AB indicated that, while the anti-protection principle articulated by Article III:1
'
a distinction must be made between
"informs the rest of Article III,"115
Article 111:2 (internal taxes), second sentence, which applies to "directly
competitive or substitutable products" and specifically refers to Article
111:1, and Article 111:2, first sentence, and Article 111:4 (internal regulation), which apply to "like products" and do not specifically refer to Article 111:1.116 In interpreting Article 111:2, second sentence, the AB has
adopted an approach that is not substantively different from the aim-andeffects approach - it examined the market effects and the "protective
application" of the challenged measure to determine whether the measure was protectionist in nature. 1 7 By contrast, the AB explicitly rejected
the need to separately consider the overall policy objective set out in
114

Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,

Sale and Distributionof Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997) (adopted Sept. 25,
1997) [hereinafter EC-Bananas].
115 See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 18; Appellate
Body Report, EC-Bananas,supra note 114, T 216 (quoting Japan-Alcohol).
116 Id. GATI Article 111:2 states:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to
internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of those applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no contracting party
shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principlesset forth in paragraph1.
(emphasis added)
The Interpretive Note of Ad Article III, paragraph 2, states:
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 would
be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second sentence only
in cases where competition was involved between, on the one hand, the taxed
product and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or substitutable product
which was not similarly taxed. (emphasis added).
Article 111:4 provides:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory
of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than
that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations
and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
See GATT supra note 2, art. III and Ad art. III.
117 See Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 25, 29 (stating: "Although it is true that
the aim of a measure may not be easily ascertained, nevertheless its protective
application can most often be discerned from the design, the architecture, and the
revealing structure of a measure.") As Hudec pointed out, the concept of "protective
application" employed by the AB "for all the world looked like an objective analysis
of regulatory purpose"; and it would "make a great deal more sense if one substitutes
the word 'purpose' for 'application."' Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 373.
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Article III when interpreting the concept of "like products" under Article
111:2, first sentence, and Article 111:4.118 As a result, the criteria for defining "like products" under Article III were essentially limited to the traditional list of "objective" factors, such as physical characteristics of the
products, and would not include the regulatory aim and market effects of
the measure. 119 When using these criteria, the AB said, "panels can only
apply their best judgment in determining whether in fact products are
'like'."' 2 ° This process "will always involve an unavoidable element of
individual, discretionary judgment" and "[n]o12 1one approach to exercising
judgment will be appropriate for all cases.'
The AB's rejection of the aim-and-effects approach in defining like
products has met with criticism. Critics faulted the AB's approach in
Japan-Alcohol and EC-Bananasas being overly formalistic and providing no policy coherence on issues that go to the very core of the WTO's
policing function over domestic regulatory policy. 122 In subsequent cases,
the Appellate Body appears to have modified its position.' 23 Most notably, in EC-Asbestos, a case involving Canada's challenge of a French ban
of asbestos products as violating Article 111:4, the AB explicitly stated
that the term "like product" in Article III:4 must be interpreted to give
proper scope and meaning to the principle set out in Article 111:1.124
From this basic stand, the AB concluded that a determination of "likeness" under Article 111:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about "the
nature and125extent of a competitive relationship between and among
products.'
Regarding the first sentence of Article 111:2, the AB stated: "There is no
specific invocation in this first sentence of the general principle in Article 111:1 that
admonishes Members of the WTO not to apply measures 'so as to afford protection.'
This omission must have some meaning. We believe the meaning is simply that the
presence of a protective application need not be established separately from the
specific requirements that are included in the first sentence in order to show that a tax
measure is inconsistent with the general principle set out in the first sentence."
Japan-Alcohol,supra note 21, at 18. The AB applied the same reasoning to Article
111:4 in EC-Bananas: "Article 111:4 does not specifically refer to Article II:1.
Therefore, a determination of whether there has been a violation of Article 111:4 does
not require a separate consideration of whether a measure 'afford[s] protection to
domestic production."' Supra note 114, $ 216.
"I See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 20.
120 Id. at 20-21.
121 Id.
122 See Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 375.
123 See Porges & Trachtman, supra note 96 (reviewing six WTO cases decided
118

under GATI Article III subsequent to Japan-Alcohol and suggesting that the AB's
more recent decisions have opened the door for the "resurrection" of the aim-and-

effects test).
124
125

Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 94,
Id. $ 99.

98.
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As it now stands, with respect to "like products" in Article 111:4, the
AB has embraced market "effects" as the central element in defining
likeness, but has not recognized the relevance of regulatory "aim" to the
likeness determination. 126 With respect to "like products" in Article 111:2,
first sentence, the AB has recognized neither the market effects nor the
regulatory aim of a challenged measure as relevant to its definition. It
should be noted, however, that because "like products" in the first sentence of Article 111:2 are considered a subset of the broader category of
"directly competitive or substitutable products,"' 1 27 if the challenged measure is also scrutinized under the second sentence of Article 111:2, which
is often the case, 28 the overall policy objective of Article III will be taken
into consideration.
2.

Applying the Similarly-Situated Analysis

The merit of the aim-and-effects approach can be readily assessed by
applying the similarly-situated analysis. Under this analysis, whether
imported and domestic products are "like" cannot be determined meaningfully without reference to the purposes of the Article III provisions
that require their comparison. Once the purposes of those provisions are
identified, we can evaluate whether and to what extent the consideration
of the "aim" and "effects" of a measure helps to advance such purposes.
The policy objective of Article III is set out in Article 111:1, which
establishes a general principle that internal taxes and regulations "should
In EC-Asbestos, instead of recognizing the regulatory aim of the French ban on
asbestos as a relevant factor in defining "like products" under Article 111:4, the AB
interpreted the health risks associated with the asbestos products - the apparent
"aim" of the French measure - as physical characteristics of the products. See id.
127 See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 118, WT/
DS75, 84/AB/R (adopted Feb. 17, 1999) [hereinafter Korea-Alcohol]; Appellate Body
Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 25.
128 The tribunals may find a violation of the second sentence of Article 111:2
without making a finding under the first sentence of Article 111:2. See Appellate Body
Report, Canada-CertainMeasures Concerning Periodicals, 22-23, 30-32, WT/DS31/
AB/R (June 30, 1997) (adopted July 31, 1997) [hereinafter Canada-Periodicals];
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Alcoholic, supra note 127; Appellate Body Report,
Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R, WT/DS110/AB/R (Dec. 13,
1999) (adopted Jan. 12, 2000) [hereinafter Chile-Alcohol]. On the other hand, if
imported and domestic products are found to be "like products" and the imported
product is taxed in excess of the domestic product, there is a violation of the first
sentence of Article 111:2, and it is not necessary to examine the same measure under
the second sentence of Article 111:2. See e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol,
supra note 21, at 20 (with respect to taxes on shochu and vodka); Panel Report,
Dominican Republic-Measures Affecting the Importation and Internal Sale of
Cigarettes,
7.327-7.364, WT/DS302/R (Nov., 26, 2004) (adopted May 19, 2005, as
upheld by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS302/AB/R).
126
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not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.' ' 129 As the Appellate Body explained:
The broad and fundamental purpose of Article III is to avoid protectionism in the application of internal tax and regulatory measures.
More specifically, the purpose of Article III "is to ensure that internal measures 'not be applied to imported or domestic products so as
to afford protection to domestic production."130 (emphasis added)
The AB further stated that this general principle set out in Article 111:1
"'informs' the rest of Article III and acts 'as a guide to understanding and
specific obligations contained' in the other paragraphs of
interpreting the
1
Article III.'1'
Given this clearly defined purpose - avoiding protectionism - of Article III, factors that are relevant to the likeness determination under the
Article III provisions must be those that are helpful in ascertaining
whether a measure is protectionist in nature. The aim-and-effects
approach identifies the regulatory aim and market effects of the challenged measure as the two key factors in detecting protectionism. The
role of market effects (i.e., the effects of a measure on the conditions of
competition between imported and domestic products 3 2) is easy to
understand. Evidently, if a measure does not have the effect of modifying
the conditions of competition in favor of domestic products, it will not
give rise to the issue of protectionism. In this sense, "market effects" is a
factor necessary or indispensable in determining whether two products
are "like" under Article III.133 The focus on the market effects, or the
competitive relationship between imported and domestic products, also
brings policy coherence to the list of traditionally used factors. These factors - physical characteristics, end uses, consumers' taste and habit, and
tariff classification - are relevant to the likeness decision only because,
129

GATT, supra note 2, art. 111:1.

130 Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 16 (footnote

omitted).
131 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 94, 94 (quoting Appellate
Body Report in Japan-Alcohol).
132 The AB has confirmed the understanding that Article III requires Members "to
provide equality of competitive conditions for imported products in relation to
domestic products" and that it "protects expectations not of any particular trade
volume but rather of the equal competitive relationship between imported and
domestic products." Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 16.
133 There are, of course, further issues regarding how to measure the market
effects or determine the competitive relationship between imports and domestic
products. As the AB pointed out, "there is a spectrum of degrees of 'competitiveness'
or 'substitutability' of products in the marketplace, and that it is difficult, if not
impossible, in the abstract, to indicate precisely where on this spectrum the word 'like'
in Article III:4 of the GAIT 1994 falls." Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra

note 94, T 99.
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and only to the extent that, they inform the market effects of a measure
at issue. As noted above, the AB has now fully embraced the use of market effects in defining not only "directly competitive or substitutable
products" under Article 111:2,"' but also "like products" under Article
111:4.135
What about the role of regulatory aim in detecting protectionism?
Given that "protectionism" suggests intent to protect, few would doubt
that it is useful to examine the purposes of a measure in order to ascertain whether it is protectionist in nature.'3 6 The only question, and an
entirely separate one, is how the regulatory purposes should be determined - should they be identified by the assertion of the Member imposing the measure (asserted purposes) or by the WTO tribunal objectively
(actual purposes)?
It is important to recall that the Appellate Body has never rejected the
examination of regulatory purposes, as objectively determined, under the
second sentence of Article 111:2.137 The AB's view on the role of regulatory purposes in detecting protectionism was most clearly expressed in
Chili-Alcohol,138 a case involving the issue of whether Chilean taxes differentially levied on the low-alcohol Chilean pisco and certain high-alcohol imported spirits violated the second sentence of Article 111:2:
134 See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 25 (indicating
that it is appropriate to look at "competition in the relevant markets" as one of the
means of identifying "directly competitive or substitutable" products); Appellate
Body Report, Korea-Alcohol, supra note 127, 127 (stating that in interpreting the
term "directly competitive or substitutable product," it is "not only legitimate, but
even necessary" to take into account the purpose of maintaining equality of
competitive conditions for imported and domestic products).
135 See supra text at note 125.
136 Hudec believed that GATT/WTO tribunals had relied on a "smell test" in most
of their likeness decisions under Article III and would continue to do so in the future.
"Common sense tells us that whenever a panel member is asked to decide whether a
particular regulatory measure is or is not playing by the rules, that panel member will
instinctively want to know whether the measure has a bona fide regulatory purpose
and to what extent its market effects are protective." Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra
note 96, at 377. Regan has argued that the central question in reviewing a measure
under Article III is whether the measure is the result of a protectionist legislative
purpose. Regan, supra note 112, at 738.
137 See supra text at note 117. Applying its "objective" standard of ascertaining
regulatory aim, the AB has struck down a number of facially origin-neutral tax
measures upon examining their designs and structures, rejecting their asserted
regulatory purposes. See e.g., Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol,supra note 21;
Appellate Body Report, Korea-Alcohol,supra note 127; and Appellate Body Report,
Chile-Alcoholic, supra note 128. Nonetheless, where a measure's declared purpose
was to protect domestic production, the AB did not hesitate to use such asserted
purpose as evidence of the measure's protective nature. See Appellate Body Report,
Canada-Periodicals,supra note 128, at 30-32.
138 Appellate Body Report, Chile-Alcoholic, supra note 128.
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[W]e consider that a measure's purposes, objectively manifested in
the design, architecture and structure of the measure, are intensely
pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not that measure is
applied so as to afford protection to domestic production.13 9
Here, the AB has explicitly recognized the regulatory aim of a measure as
a highly relevant ("intensely pertinent") factor in determining whether it
is protectionist in nature.
However, the AB will use this "intensely pertinent" factor only in
determining whether a tax measure is protectionist under the second sentence of Article 111:2, when the imported and domestic products are
defined as "directly competitive or substitutable."' 40 When the imported
and domestic products are defined as "like products" under the first sentence of Article 111:2, a measure will be found in violation of Article III,
i.e., protectionist, if it taxes the imported product "in excess of" the
domestic product, irrespective of its regulatory purposes.' 4 ' Similarly,
when a measure is challenged under Article 111:4, which contains only a
single category of "like products," whether the measure is protectionist
will be determined solely by an analysis of its market effects without con139 Id.
71. The AB also said: "The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of
individual legislators or regulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they
are not accessible to treaty interpreters. It does not follow, however, that the statutory
purposes or objectives - that is, the purpose or objectives of a Member's legislature
and government as a whole - to the extent that they are given objective expression in
the statute itself, are not pertinent." Id. 62 (emphasis original). See Regan, supra
note 112, for detailed comments on the AB's position in Chile-Alcohol.
140 In interpreting the second sentence of Article 111:2, the AB adopts an approach
of examining the following three issues separately: (i) whether the imported and
domestic products are "directly competitive or substitutable"; (ii) whether the directly
competitive or substitutable products are "not similarly taxed"; and (iii) whether the
dissimilar taxation of such products is applied "so as to afford protection to domestic
production." See Appellate Body Report, Japan-Alcohol, supra note 21, at 24. In
determining whether the products are directly competitive or substitutable, it focuses
solely on the competitive relationship between the products. In determining whether
such products are not similarly taxed, it holds that the differential taxes must be more
than de minimis and that what amounts to de minimis must be determined on a caseby-case basis. It is in the inquiry of whether the dissimilar taxation is applied "so as to
afford protection to domestic production" that it examines the aim of the measure, as
objectively determined. See id. at 25-29. The AB also indicates, however, that if there
is a finding that the "directly competitive or substitutable products" are not
dissimilarly taxed, then there is "neither need nor justification" for inquiring further
as to whether the taxes have been applied so as to afford protection. Id. at 27. Thus,
the AB segregates the inquiry of regulatory purpose from the two similarity
determinations (similarity between products and similarity between taxes). As a
result, its interpretive approach to the second sentence of Article 111:2 suffers from
the same problem as its interpretive approach to Article 111:4.
141 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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sideration of its regulatory purposes. 4 2 The inconsistency in the AB's
interpretive approach to these provisions is apparent.
From a policy standpoint, it makes little sense that whether regulatory
aim is considered in detecting protectionism should depend on whether
the paragraph invoked explicitly refers to Article III:1,14a given that the
same policy objective in Article 111:1 informs and guides the interpretation of the rest of Article 111. Drawing such a distinction in the interpretive approach is particularly problematic between Articles 111:2 and 111:4,
since a tax measure, covered by Article 111:2, and a non-tax measure, covered by Article 111:4, can often be used to achieve the same ends."' As
the AB acknowledged,
[i]t would be incongruous if, due to a significant difference in the
product scope of these two provisions, Members were prevented
from using one form of regulation - for instance, fiscal - to protect
domestic production of certain products, but were able to use
another form of regulation - for instance, non-fiscal - to achieve
those ends. This would frustrate a consistent applicationof the "general principle" in Article 111:1.145 (emphasis added)
Based on this rationale, the AB has concluded that the product scope in
Article 111:4 is broader than that of "like products" in the first sentence of
Article 1111:2, but not broader than that of "directly competitive or substitutable products" under the second sentence of Article 111:2.4' In light of
the AB's ruling on the relationship between the two provisions, one cannot help but question whether the divergence in the AB's interpretive
approach would not "frustrate a consistent application" of the general
principle in Article 111:1, a result that the AB itself has specifically
warned against.' 4 7
The analysis of "market effects," or the competitive relationship between
products, under Article 111:4 integrates the examination of the traditionally used
factors for like products. See supra text at note 125; see also, Appellate Body Report,
Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
137, WT/
DS161/AB/R(Dec. 11, 2000) (adopted Jan. 10, 2001) [hereinafter Korea-Beef] (stating
that whether or not imported products are treated "less favorably" than like domestic
products under Article 111:4 should be assessed "by examining whether a measure
modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the detriment of
imported products.").
143 See supra text at note 116.
144 Appellate Body Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 94,
99.
145 Id.
146 Id. The AB has however declined to decide if the scope of "like products" in
Article 111:4 "is co-extensive" with the combined scope of "like" and "directly
competitive or substitutable" products in Article 111:2. Id.
147 It has been suggested that although the AB has refused to consider regulatory
purposes in defining "like products" under Article III:4, it may move towards
recognizing the relevance of regulatory purposes in the determination of "less
favorable treatment." See Porges & Trachtman, supra note 96, at 795. It should be
142
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Perhaps more importantly, by excluding regulatory purposes from the
likeness decision under Article III, the AB has made a normative decision that may affect the balance between the WTO interest in preventing
disguised protectionism on the one hand, and the need to respect legitimate regulatory interests of the Members on the other. To the extent that
regulatory aim is taken merely as a highly relevant, but not an indispensable, factor in detecting the protectionist nature of a measure, the tribunal
has the discretion whether to consider it in making likeness decisions.
Presently, a Member's measure can be found in violation of the first sentence of Article 111:2 or Article 111:4 even if the measure is origin-neutral
and has bona fide (non-protectionist) regulatory purposes. The only avenue through which the importing Member can defend its measure in such
cases is to invoke the general exceptions under Article XX, which contains only a limited number of policy grounds for justifying a departure
from GATT obligations.14 Thus, by excluding from the likeness decision
the consideration of regulatory purpose-an "intensely pertinent" factor
in discerning protectionism-the AB has effectively adopted a strict standard of review under the first sentence of Article 111:2 and under Article
111:4.
In sum, applying the similarly-situated analysis to the interpretation of
like products has revealed an inconsistency in the AB's interpretation of
GATF Article III provisions. It has also confirmed the merit of the aimand-effects doctrine. The aim-and-effects approach provides policy guidance and certainty to the application of Article III because it recognizes
that the most relevant factors in the likeness decision are those that are
helpful in detecting protectionism, the prevention of which is the fundamental purpose of Article III.
IV.

THE "SIMILARLY-SITUATED"

CONCEPT OUTSIDE MFN AND

NT

PROVISIONS: LIKE CONDITIONS

This section seeks to apply similarly-situated analysis to WTO nondiscrimination obligations outside the realm of MFN and NT provisions.
Such obligations are explicitly provided in GATT Article XX, GATS
Article XIV, the SPS Agreement, and the Enabling Clause. While the
MFN and NT obligations equalize treatment of Members on the basis of
"like products," "like services" or "like service suppliers," the non-discriminatory obligations beyond MFN and NT provisions are measured by
equal treatment of Members with the "same," "like" or "similar" conditions. In contrast with the considerable amount of literature on "like
noted that the determination of "less favorable treatment" involves a comparison
between treatment accorded to two groups of products. Insofar as the comparison is
made to determine the sameness or likeness or similarity between such treatment, the
similarly-situated paradigm should also apply to the determination of "less favorable
treatment." See supra Section II.A, last paragraph.
148

See infra Section IV.A.
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products,"' 49 the concept of "like conditions" has not generated much
discussion. There have been only a handful of WTO cases interpreting
the concept, and the relevant WTO jurisprudence is still at an early stage
of development. This section will provide an analysis of the major cases
interpreting "like conditions" and examine such interpretation in light of
the similarly situated paradigm.
A.

Nondiscrimination under GATT Article XX

As noted above, GATT Article XX permits a Member to adopt measures that depart from its GATT obligations, including the MFN and NT
obligations, on certain public policy grounds. Set out in paragraphs (a) to
(j) of Article XX, these policies include: protection of public morals; protection of human, animal or plant life or health; enforcement of domestic
law not inconsistent with GAT-; protection of intellectual property
rights; prison labor policy; protection of national treasures; conservation
of exhaustible natural resources; implementation of intergovernmental
commodity agreements; gold and silver trade; and ensuring supply to
domestic production.
Invocation of Article XX(a) to (j) is subject to the specific conditions
contained in these paragraphs. In addition, it is subject to the general
requirement set out in the introductory clause (the chapeau) of Article
XX that "such measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitraryor unjustifiable discriminationbetween countries
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade." (emphasis added)
The chapeau provision imposes an obligation of nondiscrimination that
applies a different standard from that of MFN or NT provisions. As the
Appellate Body indicated, "the nature and quality of this discrimination
[under Article XX] is different from the discrimination in the treatment
of products which was already found to be inconsistent with one of the
substantive obligations of the GATT 1994, such as Articles I, III or
XI.' 1 This discrimination "must be arbitrary or unjustifiable in character" and "must occur between countries where the same conditions prevail."'' The purpose of the chapeau, according to the AB, is to prevent
abuse of the exceptions of Article XX. "5' 2
149 See supra note 96.

150 Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, T 150, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998)
[hereinafter U.S.-Shrimp]. The AB also quoted its own statement in U.S.-Gasoline:
"The provisions of the chapeau cannot logically refer to the same standard(s) by
which a violation of substantive rule has been determined to have occurred." Id.
n.138.
151 Id.
152 Id. T 157 (reviewing the drafting history of the chapeau).
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In contrast with GATT MFN or NT provisions, which requires like
treatment of like products, Article XX requires like treatment of all
Members with like conditions.This condition-based criterion for comparison between Members is arguably broader in scope than the productbased criterion under the MFN or NT clauses. Given the difference in
criteria, a government measure that falls under Article XX(a) to (j) will
have to be examined separately against the nondiscrimination standard of
Article XX, whether or not such measure violates MFN or NT
obligations.
It is unclear, however, what "conditions" are relevant and therefore
should be used for comparison between Members under Article XX.
Prior to the establishment of the WTO, GATT panels had largely kept
their distance from the chapeau provision, avoiding making decisions
under its rather general language.'" 3 The Appellate Body, on the other
hand, has grappled with the provision from the beginning, and its interpretation has breathed fresh life
into the chapeau, generating a new body
54
of Article XX jurisprudence.1
1. Leading Cases Involving Interpretation of the Chapeau
Because Article XX exceptions apply to all substantive GATI obligations, measures brought to the scrutiny of the chapeau requirement can
be divided into two categories: those that have been found to violate
MEN or NT obligations, and those that have been found to violate
another GATT provision, such as Article XI which prohibits quantitative
restrictions on imports. The first category typically involves measures that
are discriminatory on their face (that is, measures imposing differential
treatment of products on the basis of their national origins), whereas the
second category measures that are formally origin-neutral. In either situation, the challenged measure will be separately examined under the chapeau standards of nondiscrimination.
(a) Measures that have been found to violate MFN or NT obligations
The leading case in this category is U.S.-Gasoline,"' the first WTO
case to interpret the chapeau of Article XX. At issue was a U.S. measure
that formally discriminated between domestic and foreign products. In
order to control air pollution, the United States adopted certain standards for gasoline quality, and measured compliance by comparing
existing gasoline emissions against the level of emissions in 1990. In
implementing these standards, the U.S. permitted one method (individual
153 Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 381.
"I Donald M. McRae, GATT Article XX and the WTO Appellate Body, in NEW
DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN H.

JACKSON 219, 227 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard

Quick eds., Kluwer Law

International 2000) (containing a critical assessment of the new jurisprudence).

15 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline,supra note 810.
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baseline) to measure the cleanness of domestically-produced gasoline,
but required another (statutory baseline) to measure imported gasoline.
This distinction resulted in less favorable treatment of imported gasoline.
Brazil and Venezuela brought the case to the WTO. The Panel found that
the U.S. measure violated the national treatment provision of Article
111:4, and could not be justified by Article XX(b), (d) or (g).'" 6 The U.S.
appealed the Panel decision regarding Article XX(g), contending that its
rules were "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources"
(clean air) within the meaning of Article XX(g). To justify its discriminatory rules, the U.S. cited the difficulties involved in verification and
enforcement of individual baselines in foreign countries, claiming that the
same enforcement conditions did not prevail in the United States and
other countries.' 5 7 In addition, the U.S. claimed that requiring domestic
refiners to use statutory baseline would be physically and financially
impossible because of the magnitude of the changes that would be
required in almost all U.S. refineries. 5 '
In its decision, the Appellate Body agreed with the United States that
its rules were within the meaning of Article XX(g), but held that the
application of these rules constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a
"disguised restriction on international trade" under the chapeau. 1 59 The
AB reached this conclusion based on the finding of two omissions on the
part of the United States. First, the AB found that the U.S. did not make
any reasonable effort to mitigate the administrative problems that it
relied on for rejecting individual baselines for foreign refiners. Second,
while the U.S. had considered the high costs of imposing statutory baselines for its domestic refiners, it had failed to do the same for foreign
refiners. 160 According to the AB, "these two omissions go well beyond
what was necessary for the Panel to determine a violation of Article 111:4
had occurred in the first place.'' 1 In reaching this conclusion, the AB did
not explicitly examine and make a finding on whether the same conditions prevailed between the U.S. and the complainant countries. Instead,
it held in effect that the differences in enforcement conditions between
the United States and other countries could not justify the differential
treatment of foreign refiners absent a showing that the United States had
made a reasonable effort to mitigate them.
156

Panel Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional

Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) (adopted May 20, 1996, as modified by Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R).
17 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 25.
158

159
160
161

Id. at 29.
Id.

Id.
The AB continued to state that the "resulting discrimination must have been

foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable." Id.
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Another case involving the application of the chapeau of Article XX to
a facially discriminatory measure is Argentina-Bovine Hides. 6 ' In this
case, Argentina was found to have taxed imports "in excess of" like
domestic products in violation of Article 111:2. Argentina defended its
discriminatory taxes under Article XX(d) which exempts from GATT
obligations measures "necessary to secure compliance with" domestic law
consistent with GATT. The Panel held that the tax measure met the
requirement of Article XX(d), but its application constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" in violation of the chapeau. According to the Panel,
the discrimination was unjustifiable because it was not "unavoidable"
(i.e., necessary) for the operation of the tax measure.' 6 3 In reaching this
conclusion, the Panel skipped the step of examining whether the same
Argentina and exporting Members. It
conditions prevailed between
64
explained in a footnote:1
Argentina has not been able to convince us that, in the present case
and for purposes of applying the chapeau, "same conditions [do not] prevail" between Argentina and the European Communities. In particular,
the fact that Argentina is a developing country Member which has to
contend with low levels of compliance with its tax laws, does not, in our
view, provide a justification for discriminating against imported products
under the facts of the present case. It should be recalled, moreover, that
the Appellate Body in United States-Gasoline - a case which also
involved discrimination between imported and like domestic products did not specifically examine and make a finding on whether the "same
conditions prevail[ed]" between Brazil and Venezuela, on the one hand,
and the United States, on the other hand. We therefore do not see a need
to further examine this element. (citation omitted)
As a result of skipping the likeness analysis under the chapeau, the
Panel effectively examined the same discrimination, i.e., higher taxes on
imports, under Article XX and Article 111:2, which is contrary to the AB's
instruction that the nature and quality of the discrimination found under
Article XX must be different from the discrimination found under Article
I or 111.165 The Panel's decision in this case was not appealed.
162 Panel Report, Argentina-Measures Affecting the Export of Bovine Hides and
the Import of Finished Leather, WT/DS155/R (Dec. 19, 2000) (adopted Feb. 16, 2001)
[hereinafter Panel Report, Argentina-Bovine Hides].
163 Id. T 11.324.
164 Id. n.570.

165 See supra text at note 150. It should be noted that the Panel's conclusion was
based on drawing a rather artificial and ultimately inconsequential distinction
between the tax measure on the one hand, and the application of the tax measure
resulting in discrimination against imports on the other. The Panel's decision would
have been sounder if it had simply ruled that the tax measure in violation of Article
111:2 did not meet the necessity test under Article XX(d). See Appellate Body Report,
Korea-Beef, supra note 142 (holding that the challenged measure in violation of
Article 111:4 did not meet the "necessity" test under Article XX(d)).
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(b) Measures that have not been found in violation of MFN or NT
provisions
A measure may be found to be inconsistent with the nondiscrimination
requirement of Article XX even when no violation of MFN or NT obligations has been established. This was the case in U.S.-Shrimp.166 The measure in dispute was the implementation of United States law that
prohibited shrimp imports unless the shrimp exporting country obtained
U.S. certification for compliance with the U.S. requirements for protection of sea turtles in shrimp harvesting. Because the ban was clearly a
violation of GATT Article XI:1, which prohibits quantitative restrictions
on importation, the United States relied on Article XX(g) for defense,
which exempts measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." The Appellate
Body held that the U.S. measure, while qualifying for provisional justification under Article XX(g), failed to meet the nondiscrimination standards under the chapeau of Article XX.' 67
Specifically, the Appellate Body held that the U.S. ban was applied in a
manner constituting arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail.' 68 The AB reached this conclusion upon making two comparisons: first, between the United States
and .the shrimp exporting countries, and second, between the various
shrimp exporting countries. In the first comparison, the AB found that
the United States used an economic embargo to require all shrimp
exporting countries to adopt "essentially the same" policy and enforcement program as applied in the United States "without taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the territories of those
other Members.' ' 1 69 In the second comparison, the AB found that the
United States had treated selected shrimp exporting Members better than
166 Supra note 150. The complainants in this case originally claimed that the U.S.
measure violated GATI" Articles 1:1 and XIII:1. Having found the ban violated
Article XI, however, the Panel ruled that it was no longer necessary to review these
claims. See Panel Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, $$ 7.18-7.23, WT/DS58/R (15 May 1998) (adopted Nov. 6. 1998, as
modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R) [hereinafter Panel Report,
U.S.-Shrimp].
167 The AB has interpreted the chapeau as containing three standards, i.e., "the
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination standards and the disguised restriction on
international trade standard." Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline,supra note 80,
at 23.
184.
168 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150,
169 Id. 164. In addition, the AB found that the United States had banned shrimp

caught using methods identical to those employed by U.S. vessels solely because they
were caught in waters of countries that had not been certified by the United States.
The resulting situation, according to the AB, was "difficult to reconcile with the
desired policy objective of protecting and conserving sea turtles." Id. T 165.
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others in that it had negotiated with certain shrimp exporting countries
on conservation of sea turtles but not with others; that it had made
greater efforts to transfer technology for sea-turtle protection to some
shrimp exporting countries than to others; and that it had granted some
shrimp exporting countries longer "phase-in" periods for complying with
U.S. requirements than that granted to others. 170 In short, the AB faulted
the United States both for its failure to treat differently-situated countries
differently (as between the U.S. and shrimp exporting countries) and for
its failure to treat similarly-situated countries similarly (as between
shrimp exporting countries). 171 These failures, according to the AB, constitute "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" discrimination between countries
where the same conditions prevail.
The AB's decision in U.S.-Shrimp demonstrates the broad scope of the
nondiscrimination obligation under Article XX. Although no violation of
MFN or NT obligations had been established in this case, the AB made
both MFN-like and NT-like comparisons under the chapeau of Article
XX. In the MFN-like comparison, the AB examined not only the factors
that might be covered by MIFN provisions (e.g., the differing phase-in
periods 7 2 ), but also factors that are arguably beyond the reach of these
provisions, such as efforts to engage in negotiations and to transfer technology. 173 In the NT-like comparison, 17 the AB found that the very fact
that the U.S. imposed the same requirements on both domestic and for172-176. The United States essentially provided better treatment to the
shrimp exporting countries that entered into the Inter-American Convention for the
Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles. It should be noted that with respect to
the second ground, the AB apparently assumed that the same conditions prevailed in
all shrimp exporting countries.
171 The AB stated: "We believe that discrimination results not only when countries
in which the same conditions prevail are differently treated, but also when the
application of the measure at issue does not allow for any inquiry into the
appropriateness of the regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those
exporting countries." Id. 165.
172 The complainants in this case had claimed that the differences in the phase-in
period violated GATT Articles 1:1 and XIII:1, the latter provision in particular
requires that no quantitative restriction on imports may be imposed on any member
unless like product from all third countries is "similarly prohibited or restricted." See
Panel Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 166, 7.19.
173 Note the scope of MFN under GATT Article 1:1 covers customs duties and
charges, the method of levying such duties and charges, all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation, internal taxation and regulations. It
seems a stretch to interpret U.S. negotiation and technology transfer efforts as
"formalities in connection with importation."
174 On its face, an import ban is not an internal measure subject to Article III, but
a quantitative restriction on imports subject to Article XI. However, according to the
headnote of Ad Article III, if a border measure is merely enforcing a domestic law
that applies equally to both domestic and imported products, it is to be regarded as an
internal measure subject to Article III. For example, a French ban on importation of
170

Id.

258

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:215

eign producers constituted discrimination under Article XX, which is in
sharp contrast to the NT requirement under Article III where formally
identical 175
treatment of like products would not be the basis for
violation.
Thus, it appears that with respect to measures that are provisionally
justified under paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX, the Appellate Body
has interpreted the chapeau of Article XX to impose a higher and more
general standard of nondiscrimination than that for the MFN or NT provisions. The chapeau standard appears to be higher because a measure, as
applied,' 7 6 may be held as inconsistent with the nondiscriminatory
requirement of the chapeau when it has not been found to violate MFN
or NT obligations (as in U.S.-Shrimp), or when a violation of MFN or NT
provisions by the measure is otherwise exemptible (as in U.S.-Gasoline).
The chapeau standard is also more general than the MFN or NT standard
since the basis for determining whether discrimination exists under Article XX is like "conditions" prevailing in the countries involved, a term
that can cover not only products, but potentially any other factor that can
affect the production of products. Furthermore, for cases in which Article
XX is invoked to defend a violation of Article XI (or another GATT
provision other than MFN or NT clauses) and a claim under Article I or
III is not reviewed by the panel on the grounds of judicial economy, the
chapeau of Article XX provides another chance to examine the discriminatory effect of the challenged measure.
Like Conditions - An Underdeveloped Concept
Despite the fact that discrimination under Article XX is defined as
"between countries where the same conditions prevail," the Appellate
Body has not focused on the meaning of "the same conditions" in its
decisions. In U.S.-Gasoline, the AB did not address the validity of the
U.S. argument that different conditions existed between the U.S. and for2.

asbestos products was scrutinized under GATT Article III. See Appellate Body
Report, EC-Asbestos, supra note 94.
175 Cf.The national treatment provision under GATS Article XVII:3: "Formally
identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be less favorable if it
modifies the conditions of competition in favor of services or service suppliers of the
Member compared to like services or service suppliers of any other Member." GATS,
supra note 3, art. XVII:3.
176 The AB has distinguished a "measure" to be scrutinized under (a) to () of
Article XX from the "application" of the measure to be scrutinized under the
chapeau. See U.S.-Gasoline,supra note 80, at 22; U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 166, IT 147
and 160. In these cases, the AB interpreted the "measure" not as the GATl-violating
part of a regulation, but the entire regulation in which the GAIT-illegal provision
appeared. Since the entire regulation in these cases easily met the standard of Article
(g), it became necessary to examine the GATT-illegal portion as the "application" of
the measure under the chapeau. See Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 380,
for an analysis of the AB's interpretative approach to Article XX.
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eign countries with respect to enforcement of U.S. law; instead, it rejected
the argument on the grounds that the United States had not made a reasonable effort to mitigate such differences. In U.S.-Shrimp, when finding
that the United States failed to accord the same treatment to various
exporting members, the AB apparently assumed that the same conditions
prevailed in all the exporting countries; when finding that the United
States discriminated against the exporting members, the AB conversely
assumed that different conditions prevailed between the United States
and other countries. 177 It is therefore not surprising that the Panel in
Argentina-Bovine Hide concluded that there was no need in the Article
XX analysis to specifically examine and make a finding on whether
the
178
same conditions prevailed between the countries concerned.
Why, then, has not the Appellate Body focused on the likeness analysis
in the context of Article XX? There appear to be both procedural and
substantive reasons. Procedurally, it is up to the Member invoking an
Article XX defense to demonstrate that it did not discriminate between
countries with like conditions. 7 ' If the defending Member does not make
an explicit or a convincing argument on the issue of like conditions, the
tribunal can simply find that the Member has failed to bear its burden of
proof.'8 0
Substantively, the particular structure of the GATr nondiscrimination
provisions has made Article XX analysis rather complex and confusing.
In the broad scheme of things, nondiscrimination in international trade
should cover all forms of discrimination against the trade interests of
Members, whether such interests are based on product or otherwise; and
the discrimination may be excused if it is necessary for or rationally
related to, depending on the applicable standard of scrutiny, a non-trade
interest recognized by the Members as legitimate. This is essentially the
"I The AB seemed to suggest that different conditions relevant in this case might
include the actual incidence of sea turtles, the species of sea turtles, or other
differences or disparities that may exist in different waters, when it commented that
while the United States may ignore these factors in imposing the same standards on
all domestic producers, it is inappropriate to do so to foreign countries. See Appellate
Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150,
164. However, there was no specific
examination or finding on the issue.
178 See supra text at note 164.
179 The general exceptions in Article XX are "in the nature of affirmative
defenses" and the burden of establishing such a defense rests on the party asserting it.
Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Affecting Imports of Woven Wool
Shirts and Blouses from India, 16, WT/DS33/AB/R (Apr. 25, 1997) (adopted May 23,
1979). See generally, Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proofand Persuasionin WTO Dispute
Settlement: Who Bears the Burden? 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 227 (1998).
'8I In both U.S.-Gasoline and Argentina-Bovine Hides, the defending Member
was unable to convince the tribunal that different conditions prevailed between it and
other Members.
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approach adopted by U.S. courts under the commerce clause. 181 In contrast to this simple structure, the GATT nondiscrimination provisions are
split into two tiers. The first tier consists of the product-based MFN and
NT obligations; and the second tier a generally worded nondiscrimination
obligation under the chapeau of Article XX. The policy exceptions of
paragraphs (a) to (j) of Article XX are set in between the two tiers.
Paragraphs (a) to (j) use various terms describing the requisite connection between a particular policy ground and the measure to be excused.
They range from "necessary" and "essential," to "relating to," "for the
protection of," "in pursuance of" and "involving," indicating different
levels of scrutiny required.182 For a measure falling under a policy exception that is subject to a less strict standard of scrutiny, such as the "relating to" or "involving" standard, it is relatively easy to meet the
requirement of policy justification. After such a measure has been determined to have a justifiable purpose, however, its application must still be
judged against the requirement of the chapeau. 1 83 In order to determine
whether the discriminatory aspect of the measure is otherwise permissible
under the chapeau, the tribunal is compelled to apply a separate (and so
far not well-defined) standard of scrutiny to interpret the "arbitrary" or
"unjustifiable" language of the chapeau as the final test for the permissibility of the discrimination.Y' This convoluted structure of GATT antidiscrimination provisions can obscure the need to focus on the concept of
like conditions.
In addition, the AB's analysis of the concept of discrimination under
the chapeau may also have contributed to the lack of focus on the concept of like conditions. The AB has enunciated a three-element approach
to the interpretation of the nondiscrimination requirement under the chapeau: first, the application of the measure in question must result in discrimination; second, the discrimination must be arbitrary or unjustifiable
in character; and third, the discrimination must occur between countries
181 See supra text at notes 44 to 65. See also Farber & Hudec, supra note 46, for a
comparative study between GATT and the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution.
For a critique of that study, see Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between
International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What Lessons Should (and Should
Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce
Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN
WORLD TRADE LAW 139, supra note 89, at 139.

182 See GATT, supra note 2, art. XX, paragraphs (a) through ().
183 See supra note 176.
184 For example, in U.S.-Gasoline, the AB essentially held that it was unnecessary
for the United States to resort to the discriminatory means because with some
reasonable effort the United States should have been able to mitigate the differences
in enforcement of U.S. law between home and abroad. The rationale was followed by
the Panel in Argentina-Bovine Hide, which concluded that the discriminatory taxes in
that case were unjustifiable because it was not unavoidable. See Panel Report,
Argentina-Bovine Hide, supra note 162.
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where the same conditions prevail.' 8 5 The problem with this three-element analysis is that it separates the concept of "discrimination" from its
defining term "between countries where the same conditions prevail." By
treating "discrimination" as an independent element, it is possible to
reach a conclusion on the "arbitrary" or "unjustifiable" character of discrimination without having first to make a finding on the likeness
between the countries concerned. This is8 6apparently what the Panel managed to do in Argentina-Bovine Hides.'
The approach taken by the AB has resulted in less than satisfactory
legal reasoning concerning the chapeau. Without a sufficient analysis of
like conditions, the AB is unable to define the nondiscrimination requirement of Article XX clearly. Instead, it has provided "a rather broad and
impressionistic definition of the words of the chapeau, saying that the text
involved several overlapping concepts that were not easy to separate. 187
More importantly, the insufficient analysis of the concept of like conditions has led the AB to generate potentially problematic jurisprudence on
the chapeau. In U.S.-Shrimp, the AB found that the United States discriminated against the shrimp exporting Members because it required
them to adopt essentially the same regulatory program as the United
States without taking into consideration that different conditions may
occur in the territories of those Members.' 8 8 The AB did not explain,
however, what types of conditions occurring in the exporting Members
ought to be taken into account by the United States. Without providing
any guidance on how to select the conditions for comparison, the AB's
finding can have sweeping implications for future cases involving originneutral measures. Since some differences relevant to the purposes of
paragraphs (a) to (j) are bound to exist between the importing and
exporting countries concerned, virtually all formally origin-neutral measures, which by definition impose the same requirement on domestic and
foreign producers, could be found discriminatory under the chapeau of
Article XX. Consequently, the only meaningful issue in such cases would
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150, $ 150.
See supra text at notes 162-65.
1"7 Hudec, Aim and Effects, supra note 96, at 381. The following passage
demonstrates the lack of clarity in the AB's interpretation of the chapeau concepts:
"'Arbitrary discrimination', 'unjustifiable discrimination' and 'disguised restriction'
on international trade . . . impart meaning to one another. It is clear to us that
'disguised restriction' includes disguised discrimination in international trade. It is
equally clear that concealed or unannounced restriction or discrimination in
international trade does not exhaust the meaning of 'disguised restriction.' We
consider that 'disguised restriction,' whatever else it covers, may properly be read as
embracing restrictions amounting to arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination .... " See
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 24-25 (emphasis original).
188 According to McRae, this finding is "not derived from any textual analysis of
the term discrimination as used in the chapeau or in the broader context of GATT
1994 and the other WTO agreements." McRae, supra note 154, at 230.
18

186
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be to determine whether the inevitably discriminatory measure is arbi89
trary or unjustifiable - the two standards yet to be defined by the AB.1
To avoid such sweeping implications, the AB needs to further develop the
concept of like conditions.
The potentially overreaching effect of the AB's approach can also be
seen in its finding in U.S.-Shrimp that the United States discriminated
among exporting Members. In this finding, the AB used technology
transfer and participation in international negotiation as the bases for
comparing U.S. treatment of various other Members. While international
cooperation is essential for effective conservation of highly migratory
species such as sea turtles, positive efforts to engage in such cooperation
are not required by Article XX(g) or any other GATT provisions. 190 The
AB's approach, therefore, raises the issue whether and to what extent
non-WTO requirements may be translated into WTO obligations via the
non-discriminatory provision of Article XX.191
3.

Applying the Similarly-Situated Analysis

As previously discussed, the key for defining the nondiscrimination
obligation of the chapeau lies in the relevant criteria for comparing likeness or similarity between countries. In order to determine what conditions prevailing in the countries involved are relevant to the comparison,
one must first identify the purpose for which such comparison is to be
made. A condition should be used only if it helps to further that purpose.
Unless the condition is indispensable in achieving that purpose, however,
it is a matter of normative decision whether to use the condition in the
likeness analysis. In making such normative decisions, the tribunal will
apply certain standards of review.
189 Instead of defining each standard, the AB has insisted that the two standards
impart meaning to one another. See supra note 187.
190 The purpose of Article XX(g) is to exempt the conservation measures taken by
individual Members from GATIF obligations, and not to require them to participate in
conservation activities. Thus, if the United States had made no effort to transfer
technology or negotiate with any exporting country, it could not have been found to
violate the nondiscrimination requirement of Article XX on these grounds. As
previously noted, these positive efforts appear to be beyond the scope of GATT
Article 1:1. See supra note 173.
191 The AB gave the impression that international negotiation would be required
for a measure falling under Article XX(g) to pass muster under the chapeau. See
Appellate Body Report, U.S. -Shrimp, supra note 150, 91 172. The AB also
emphasized the importance of engaging in international negotiation in U.S.-Gasoline.
See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 28, n.52. In both cases,
the AB examined this factor in the context of determining whether the challenged
measure constituted "unjustifiable" discrimination. To the extent that the AB used
"unjustifiability" as a necessity test, it apparently viewed the effort to engage in
international negotiation as a "reasonably available alternative" to the discriminatory
measure in question.
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(a) Identifying the Purpose of Comparison
The purpose for comparing whether the "same" or "like" conditions
prevailed in the countries involved is to be found in both the chapeau and
the substantive provisions of (a) to (j). According to the Appellate Body,
the purpose and object of the chapeau is generally "the prevention of
abuse" of the Article XX exceptions.' 9 2 Given that Article XX sets out
ten different exceptions, what amounts to abuse of Article XX exceptions
can only be determined in the context of a particular paragraph of (a) to
(j). As the Appellate Body has pointed out:
When applied in a particular case, the actual contours and contents
of [the chapeau] standards will vary as the kind of measure under
examination varies. What is appropriately characterizable as "arbitrary discrimination" or "unjustifiable discrimination", or as a "disguised restriction on international trade" in respect of one category
of measures, need not be so with respect to another group or type of
measures. The standard of "arbitrary discrimination", for example,
under the chapeau may be different for a measure that purports to
protect public morals than for one relating to the products of prison
labor. 193

By the same token, because a finding of discrimination under the chapeau is inherently related to the substantive provisions of (a) to (j),
whether a condition is relevant to the likeness comparison under the chapeau will also depend on the particular exception invoked. Essentially,
what the chapeau requires is equal treatment of countries that are similarly situated with respect to the policy exceptions of paragraphs (a) to

(j).

- Should the regulatory purpose of the measure be considered under
the chapeau?
Having identified that the substantive provisions of (a) to () control
the relevance of the conditions for comparison under the chapeau, it is
necessary to clarify further whether it is the policy objectives of (a) to (j)
in abstract, or the regulatory purpose of a measure that is found to fall
within the provisions of (a) to (j), that should determine the relevance of
the conditions for comparison.
Although the AB has confirmed that the chapeau standards should
vary depending on the particular policy exception invoked, it appears to
have dismissed the need to consider the regulatory purpose of a measure
under the chapeau. In U.S.-Shrimp, the United States argued that if a
measure differentiating between countries is "based on a rationale legiti-

151 (quoting
192 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150,
Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, at 22.)
193 Id. 120. This passage is reminiscent of the accordion metaphor used by the
Appellate Body in its interpretation of "like product" under Article III. The AB
made this statement to explain why in analyzing Article XX it is necessary to examine
the substantive provisions of (a) to (j) before the chapeau.
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mately connected with the policy of an Article XX exception, rather than
for protectionist reasons, the measure does not amount to an abuse of the
applicable Article XX exception."' 94 In rejecting the U.S. argument, the
AB stated:
The policy goal of a measure at issue cannot provide its rationale or
justification under the standards of the chapeau of Article XX. The
legitimacy of the declared policy objective of the measure, and the
relationship of that objective with the measure itself and its general
design and structure, are examined under Article XX(g) ...it does
not follow from the fact that a measure falls within the terms of Article XX(g) that that measure also will necessarily comply with the
requirements of the chapeau. To accept the argument of the United
States would be to disregard the standards established by the chapeau. 1 95 (emphasis added)
This statement, while aiming to differentiate the chapeau standards from
that of paragraph (g), seems to indicate that the policy objective of a measure should be examined only under paragraphs (a) to (j), and not under
the chapeau.
There are, however, good reasons why the regulatory purpose or policy
objective of a measure should be considered under the chapeau. First of
all, because paragraphs (a) to (j) set out the permissible policy objectives
in general terms, it would be practically impossible to identify conditions
that are relevant to such generally worded objectives in abstract. Take as
an example paragraph (g), which excuses measures "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." Since there are many different types of exhaustible natural resources, the conditions relevant to the
conservation of one type (e.g., clean air) may not be relevant to the conservation of another (e.g., sea turtles). Hence, as a practical matter, in
order to determine what conditions are relevant for comparison under
the chapeau in a given case, the tribunal needs to refer to the concrete
policy objective of the measure under review.
Furthermore, the regulatory purposes of a measure should be considered under the chapeau as a matter of sound WTO legal policy. Unlike
Article III or other GATT provisions that impose positive obligations on
Members, Article XX is designed to allow Members to escape those obligations when their measures serve certain "legitimate state policies or
interests outside the realm of trade liberalization,"' 1 96 provided that they
do not abuse this right. Therefore, in contrast with the context of Article
III - in which whether the regulatory purposes of a measure should be
taken into account remains controversial - it is undisputed that the regulatory purposes of a measure are to be considered under Article XX. In
194 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150,

148.
Id. 149.
196 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 17.
195
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practice, the WTO tribunal will begin its task under Article XX by examining whether the declared policy objective of a measure falls within the
terms of paragraphs (a) to (j), and whether the connection between the
measure and its declared policy objective meets the standards set out in
(a) to (j).' 9 7 It is only after the tribunal has determined that a measure
satisfies the requirements of (a) to (j) that it will proceed to examine the
measure under the chapeau. 198 In other words, when a measure comes to
be scrutinized under the chapeau, the legitimacy of its policy objective
has already been established for Article XX purposes. Consequently, in
deciding whether the measure is permissible under the chapeau, it is
legally sound to examine the relationship between the measure and its
declared policy objective under the chapeau standards.
Finally, it should be emphasized that, as a conceptual matter, accepting
the legitimacy of the regulatory purpose of a measure is not the same as
accepting the legitimacy of the measure itself. Whether a measure that
has been found to serve a legitimate policy objective under paragraphs
(a) to (j) is also permissible under the chapeau is to be determined separately by the review standards of the chapeau. Such standards are necessarily different from, and higher than, those of paragraphs (a) to (j), as
will be further explained below.
(b) Relevant Conditions for Comparison and Standards of Review
The above analysis establishes that whether a measure constitutes a
means of "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination" within the meaning
of the chapeau is to be determined by comparing prevailing conditions
that are relevant to the policy objective of the measure. A condition is
only relevant as the basis for comparing likeness between countries if it
serves to further that policy objective. If a condition does not serve to
advance that policy objective, it is irrelevant; and the measure differentiating between countries based on such an irrelevant condition would necessarily constitute a means of "arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination
within the meaning of the chapeau. Conversely, if a condition is indispensable in achieving the policy objective of the measure, the distinction
drawn by the measure between countries based on such a condition
would not be "arbitrary or unjustifiable." If a condition is useful, but not
indispensable, in advancing the policy objective of the measure, whether
to allow it to enter into the likeness determination under the chapeau,
i.e., whether to hold a distinction drawn on the basis of such a condition
as "arbitrary or unjustifiable," becomes a matter of normative decision.
In making such a normative decision, the tribunal would inevitably
engage in a balancing act between different interests and values. Indeed,
the AB has interpreted the application of the chapeau as a matter of
maintaining "a balance of rights and obligations" between the Member
197 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150, 1$
(establishing the proper sequence of steps in interpreting Article XX).
198 Id.

117-122
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invoking the Article XX exceptions and other Members.19 9 As it further
explained:
The task of interpreting and applying the chapeau is ...

essentially

the delicate one of locating and marking out a line of equilibrium
between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Article
XX and the rights of the other Members under varying substantive
provisions (e.g., Article XI) of the GATT 1994, so that neither of the
competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort and
nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by
the Members themselves in that Agreement. The location of the line
of equilibrium, as expressed in the chapeau, is not fixed and
unchanging; the line moves as the kind and the shape of the mea20 0
sures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.
Where to mark the line of equilibrium in a given case is a question of
standard of review. Ultimately, whether a measure constitutes a means of
"arbitrary or unjustifiable" discrimination within the meaning of the chapeau depends on the required level of connection between the measure
and its legitimate policy goal. The required level of connection in turn
depends on how strictly the tribunal scrutinizes the measure at issue. The
stricter the standard of scrutiny is applied, the higher the required level of
connection will be, and the more likely the measure will be struck down
under the chapeau.
At this juncture, it should be noted that the level of connection
required by the chapeau between a measure and its policy objective will
always be higher than that required by paragraphs (a) to (j). As previously noted, paragraphs (a) to (j) use various terms (e.g., "necessary,"
"relating to," and "involving") to describe the levels of connection
between particular policy exceptions and the measures adopted to implement them. 20 ' Given that a measure will come under the chapeau only
after it passes the scrutiny of (a) to (j), to be meaningful the chapeau
standards must be stricter than those applied under (a) to (j). In practice,
a measure scrutinized under the chapeau is likely to have been reviewed
under a paragraph that contains less than a "necessity" standard, such as
paragraph (g), which requires merely that the measure is "relating to" the
policy objective of conservation.20 2 Nonetheless, a measure meeting a
"necessity" standard under paragraphs (a) to (j) can also be scrutinized
by a higher standard under the chapeau, since the AB has distinguished
the examination of a "measure" under paragraphs (a) to (j) from that of
199 Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150,
200 Id.
159.

156.

201 See supra text at note 182.
202 The two major cases involving the application of the chapeau, U.S.-Gasoline
and U.S.-Shrimp, are both Article XX(g) cases.
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the "application" of a measure under the chapeau. 2°" Furthermore, the
AB has interpreted the "necessary" standard as covering "a range of
at the one end and "making a
degrees of necessity," with "indispensable"
20 4
contribution to" at the other.
What levels of connection, then, between a measure and its declared
policy objective have been required by the "arbitrary or unjustifiable"
standards? Although the AB has not clearly defined them, it is possible to
ascertain the standards as applied in the three cases discussed above.
In U.S.-Gasoline, it appears the AB essentially applied a "necessity"
standard to scrutinize the U.S. measure under the chapeau. As previously
noted, in defending its differential treatment between domestic and foreign refiners, the United States argued that the same conditions did not
prevail in the United States and other countries because of the substantial
difficulties involved in verification and enforcement of individual baselines in foreign territories. In other words, the United States considered
its domestic refiners and foreign refiners not to be similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of its antipollution law, using the enforcement conditions as the basis for drawing such a distinction. Insofar as such differences in enforcement conditions did exist between domestic and foreign
territories, drawing the distinction was evidently relevant to the purpose
of the antipollution law. However, the nexus between drawing such a distinction and the purpose of the law apparently did not reach the level of
necessity, i.e., drawing the distinction was not indispensable for achieving
the purpose of the law. As the AB indicated, there might well be reasonably available alternatives that the United States could use to mitigate the
differences in enforcement conditions between domestic and foreign territories. 20 5 Stating that the resulting discrimination "must have been foreseen, and was not merely inadvertent or unavoidable," the AB concluded
that the measure constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" and a "dis203 See supra note 176. The Panel in Argentina-Bovine Hides, a case involving an
interpretation of the "necessary" standard of Article XX(d), followed this interpretive
approach. See supra text at note 163.
204 See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, supra note 142,
161 (interpreting
"necessary" under Article XX(d)). In addition, the AB stated that what constitutes
"necessary" involves in every case a process of weighing and balancing a series of
factors, including the relative importance of the interests or values involved. Id. 164.
205 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 27-28 (indicating
that there were established techniques for checking, verification, assessment and
enforcement of data relating to imported goods that could be used to monitor
compliance by foreign producers). It is interesting to compare this decision with the
GATT Panel Decision, United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, (adopted
Nov. 7, 1989), GATI"Doc. L/6439, B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.) 345 (1990), which found that
the U.S. measure in violation of Article 111:4 was partially justifiable due to the
difficulties in enforcing injunctions in foreign jurisdictions. Unlike U.S.-Gasoline, this
finding was made under the necessity test of Article XX(d), rather than under the
chapeau of Article XX.
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guised restriction on international trade."2 6 Essentially, the AB held that
the U.S. measure was unnecessary for achieving its claimed policy objective. In rejecting an evidently relevant condition for comparison, therefore, the AB exercised its normative judgment and applied a standard of
strict scrutiny. Given that the U.S. measure was facially discriminatory drawing a distinction on the basis of national origins - it is understandable that a high standard of review should apply.
A similar standard was applied in Argentina-Bovine Hides, which also
involved a facially discriminatory measure. In that case, the Panel framed
its inquiry under the chapeau as "whether the extra tax burden imposed
on importers by the Argentina measure is nevertheless justifiable because
it is unavoidable for the operation of Argentina tax laws."2 °7 After pointing out some alternative courses of action available to Argentina, the
Panel concluded that the discriminatory aspect of the measure was not
"unavoidable" (i.e., not necessary) and therefore constituted "unjustifiable discrimination" within the meaning of the chapeau. 20 8
The case of U.S.-Shrimp presented a very different situation. The challenged U.S. measure in this case was origin-neutral and had not been
found to violate MFN or NT obligations. Consequently, the AB was not
asked to review a distinction drawn by the United States under its conservation law. Rather, it was asked to decide whether a violation by the U.S.
measure of Article XI:1 (prohibition of quantitative restrictions) could be
excused by Article XX. In holding that the U.S. measure fell within the
scope of Article XX(g), the AB recognized the legitimate regulatory purpose of the U.S. measure. However, it went on to find that the application
of the U.S. measure constituted arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination
within the meaning of the chapeau upon making an MFN-like comparison and an NT-like comparison. 20 9 It is in the NT-like comparison that
the AB explicitly referred to the comparison of different conditions
between the United States and other countries. The AB found that the
U.S. measure was discriminatory because it imposed an identical requirement on domestic and foreign producers without taking into consideration the possibility that conditions prevailing in other countries might be
different from those in the United States. 210 The AB, however, did not
specify what such different conditions might be.
Whatever such different conditions might be, the AB essentially held
that the U.S. measure imposing the same requirements for all shrimp producers is unnecessary for achieving its policy objective of sea turtle conservation. In other words, under U.S.-Shrimp, a Member may not impose
the same requirements for all without taking into account their different
206 See Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gasoline, supra note 80, at 29.
207 See Panel Report, Argentina-Bovine Hides, supra note 162, $ 11.324.
208
209
210

Id. $ 11.325-11.330.
See supra notes 172-175 and accompanying text.
See supra text at note 169.
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conditions unless doing so is necessary for achieving its policy goal. This
"necessity" standard, however, would effectively require a Member to
anticipate different conditions prevailing in other countries that might be
relevant to its policy objective before adopting an origin-neutral measure,
and to accommodate such different conditions to the extent feasible. This
kind of "necessity" standard would seem more difficult to satisfy than
that applied in U.S.-Gasoline. There, the AB implied that an origin-based
measure would be permissible under the chapeau if its discriminatory
effects were "unforeseen," "merely inadvertent" or "unavoidable." 2 1' 1 In
comparison, under U.S.-Shrimp, an origin-neutral measure having discriminatory effects would be permissible only if the Member had made
positive efforts to avoid such effects that might otherwise have been
unforeseen or inadvertent.
Furthermore, the AB in U.S.-Shrimp has interpreted the terms "arbitrary" and "unjustifiable" to mean something more than the standards for
the requisite level of connection between a discriminatory measure and
its declared policy objective. The AB has construed "unjustifiability" as
coerciveness, unilateralism, rigidity and inflexibility in the application of
the U.S. measure, and "arbitrariness" additionally as the lack of transparency and due process in such application. 1 2 These characteristics of a
measure, while offensive to other Members, are not inherently related to
discrimination. In reality, a Member typically adopts its regulatory measures unilaterally without consulting with other Members in advance; and
its measures may well have coercive effects on other Members and may
even be procedurally improper. But those qualities do not make the
Member's measure "discriminatory." What makes a measure discriminatory is its drawing of a distinction between similarly-situated countries. It
appears, therefore, that the AB in U.S.-Shrimp has interpreted "arbitrariness" and "unjustifiability" as independent standards for conducting
international trade relations, which are separate from the standards for
gauging the necessity of a discriminatory measure in carrying out its
declared policy objective.
In sum, it appears that the AB has applied a strict standard of review to
scrutinize an origin-based measure, as evident in U.S.-Gasoline, and an
211 See supra note 161.

Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Shrimp, supra note 150, $ 161 ("the most
conspicuous flaw in this measure's application relates to its intended and actual
coercive effect" on other Members),
172 (the "unilateral character of the
application of [the U.S. measure] heightens the disruptive and discriminatory
influence of the import prohibition and underscores its unjustifiability"), and $$ 177182 (e.g., "this rigidity and inflexibility" in the application of the measure "also
constitute 'arbitrary discrimination' within the meaning of the chapeau"; "exporting
Members applying for certification whose applications are rejected are denied basic
fairness and due process, and are discriminated against, vis-A-vis those Members
which are granted certification.").
212 See
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equally strict, if not stricter, standard to scrutinize an origin-neutral measure that has produced a discriminatory impact, as manifested in
U.S.-Shrimp. If this analysis is correct, the pattern emerging from these
cases is in sharp contrast to that of U.S. cases decided under the commerce clause, where the standards of scrutiny for origin-neutral measures
with a bona fide regulatory purpose are generally less strict than that for
facially discriminatory ones.2 13 It remains to be seen, however, whether
the same pattern will be followed in future WTO cases.
B.

Nondiscrimination under GATS Article XIV
Article XIV of GATS contains a provision similar to GATT Article
XX. It permits a WTO member to adopt measures inconsistent with its
GATS obligations if they are "necessary" for the following reasons: the
protection public morals or maintenance of public order; protection of
human, animal or plant life or health; securing compliance with laws or
regulations not inconsistent with GATS including those relating to the
prevention of deceptive practices; and the protection of privacy of individuals and safety.2 14 Similar to GATT Article XX, the chapeau of GATS
Article XIV requires that "such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on trade in services." (emphasis added) A notable difference
is that Article XIV refers to "like conditions," as opposed to "the same
conditions" contained in GATT Article XX. Technically, "like conditions" suggests a slightly different standard from "the same conditions."
For the purpose of this article, however, the difference between the two
terms is negligible, since both terms imply a comparison between relevant
conditions prevailing in the countries concerned.
In U.S.-Gambling Services, the only case interpreting GATS Article
XIV thus far, the Panel and the AB essentially followed the jurisprudence of GAIT Article XX. 2 15 The case involved Antigua's challenge
See supra text at notes 72-74.
GATS, supra note 3, art. XIV(a)-(c). In addition, Article XIV(d) and (e)
specifically exempt tax measures inconsistent with the NT obligation under Article
XVII, if the difference in treatment "is aimed at ensuring equitable or effective
imposition or collection direct taxes" with respect to foreign services or service
suppliers, and the MFN obligation under Article II, if the difference in treatment is
the result of tax treaties.
215 Panel Report, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004) [hereinafter Panel
Report, US.-Gambling]; Appellate Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005)
(adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gambling]. The
AB noted that GATS Article XIV sets out the general exceptions from obligations
under GATS "in the same manner" as does GATI" Article XX, and that it accordingly
finds previous decisions under Article XX "relevant for our analysis under Article
XIV of the GATS." Id. 291.
213
214
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against the ban imposed by the United States on the supply of cross-border gambling services. Antigua claimed that the ban violated the U.S.
market access commitments under Article XVI and the national treatment obligation under Article XVII. With respect to national treatment,
Antigua argued that the United States permitted domestic service suppliers to offer remote horse-betting services while prohibiting Antiguan service suppliers from providing cross-border gambling services to the
United States, resulting in violation of the NT obligation under GATS.
The United States denied both charges. In addition, the U.S. claimed that
in any event the ban would fall within the scope of Article XIV(a) and
(c), which respectively excuse measures inconsistent with GATS obligations that are "necessary" to protect public morals and to secure compliance with domestic law. The Panel found that the United States did make
market access commitments on gambling and betting services and that
216
the U.S. ban breached such commitments in violation of Article XVI.
Having made this finding, the Panel did not examine whether the U.S.
measure also violated the national treatment obligation under Article
XVII on the ground of judicial economy.2 17
The Panel then proceeded to the general exceptions under Article
XIV. It found that the U.S. ban did not meet the "necessary" standard
under either paragraph (a) or (c) because the United States did not resort
to consultations with Antigua as a less trade-restrictive alternative.2 18
Although after making this finding it was not necessary for the Panel to
examine the chapeau requirement, it nonetheless did so. The Panel found
that the U.S. measure was inconsistent with the chapeau of Article XIV
because the United States had failed to demonstrate that its laws prohibiting remote supply of gambling services were applied "in a consistent
manner as between those supplied domestically and those supplied from
other Members., 2 19 In making this finding, the Panel accepted the arguments made by Antigua in the context of the NT provision and did not
separately analyze the elements of the chapeau. 22 0 Thus, there was no
discussion on whether "like conditions" prevailed in the United States
and Antigua, or whether the alleged discrimination was also "arbitrary or
unjustifiable" in character. Rather, the Panel reached its conclusion
under the chapeau solely on the basis that the United States had failed to
disprove that its measure discriminated against foreign suppliers of like
services.
On appeal, the AB upheld the Panel's finding that U.S. ban violated
the market access obligations under Article XVI, but reversed its finding
that the U.S. measure did not meet the "necessary" standard under Arti216
217
218

219
220

See Panel Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 215,
Id. T 6.426.
Id.
6.528-6.531; 6.562.
Id. 6.607.
Id.
6.584-6.589.

6.258-6.421.
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cle XIV. The AB found instead that consultations with Antigua would
not have been a reasonable alternative to the ban and that the U.S. measure was necessary to protect public morals or maintain public order
within the meaning of Article XIV(a). 22 ' Regarding the chapeau analysis,
the AB agreed with the Panel that the United States had not demonstrated that its laws were applied consistently with the requirements of
the chapeau.2 2 2 In addition, the AB disagreed with the United States that
the Panel had erred in not making an assessment of whether the alleged
discrimination was also arbitrary or unjustifiable in character. The AB
indicated that such an analysis was unnecessary in this case because the
United States had asserted that there was no discrimination of any kind
in the application of its laws.223
In sum, by upholding the Panel's approach, the AB did not require the
discrimination found within the meaning of the chapeau to be different
from the violation of the NT obligation alleged by Antigua. As a result,
this case has contributed little to the interpretation of the nondiscrimination requirement of the chapeau.
Meanwhile, the AB's decision has raised an issue of consistency in
WTO jurisprudence. As previously noted, the AB has clearly stated that
the discrimination under Article XX of GATT must be different in
"nature and quality" from the discrimination that has been found to violate MFN or NT obligations. 224 Although in this case no violation of NT
obligations was established due to the Panel's exercise of judicial economy, it is nonetheless questionable whether the nature and quality of discrimination under Article XIV of GATS (or Article XX of GATT)
should become indistinguishable from that under MFN or NT provisions
solely because the tribunal chose to exercise judicial economy rather than
to examine potential violations of MFN or NT obligations. Furthermore,
when the tribunal chose to address potential violations of MFN or NT
under the chapeau of GATS Article XIV (or GATr Article XX) rather
than under the MFN and NT provisions, the burden of proof would shift
from the complainant, who has the initial burden to prove discrimination
under the MFN and NT provisions, to the respondent invoking the exceptions of GATS Article XIV (or GATT Article XX), who would then have
the burden of demonstrating that no such discrimination has ever
existed.22 5 When the nature and quality of the discrimination examined
221

The Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Gambling, supra note 215,

326. Having

reached this conclusion, the AB found it unnecessary to examine whether the
measure is justifiable under Article XIV(c). Id. 337.
222 Id. 369.
223 Id. 350 (stating further that the United States "could have, but did not, put
forward an additional argument that even if such discrimination exists, it does not rise
to the level of 'arbitrary' or 'unjustifiable' discrimination.").
224 See supra text at note 150.
225 See supra note 179.
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under the chapeau is the same as that under the M!FN or NT provisions,
the appropriateness of the burden shifting becomes questionable.
C. Nondiscrimination under the SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement sets out health and sanitary standards for food and
agricultural products, which, along with the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), supplements GAT rules on product standards. It
has long been recognized that facially-neutral product standards can be
used to discriminate against imports implicitly.22 6 Accordingly, the SPS
and the TBT agreements both provide independent obligations for nondiscrimination. The structures of their nondiscrimination provisions, however, are quite different. The TBT Agreement contains a single
nondiscrimination provision that combines the elements of GATT MFN
and NT clauses.22 7 As a result, the TBT provision simply affirms that the
MEN and NT obligations apply to technical regulations.22 8 In comparison, the SPS Agreement contains two provisions of nondiscrimination
that are worded more like the chapeau of Article XX. 22 9 The complex
structure of these provisions has generated separate jurisprudence on
nondiscrimination under the SPS Agreement.
226

See

JOHN

H.

JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS

221-224 (2d ed., The MIT Press 1997) for a

brief discussion of the rationales of the TBT and the SPS agreements.
227 See TBT Agreement, supra note 5, art. 2.1 (stating that "Members shall ensure
that in respect of technical regulations, products imported from the territory of any
Member shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded to like
products of national origin and to like products originating in any other country.") It
should be noted that the preamble of the TBT Agreement incorporates, almost
verbatim, the chapeau language of GATT Article XX.
228 To date, there has been only one WTO case involving interpretation of Article
2.1 of the TBT Agreement. See Panel Report, EC-Trademarks/GIs(Australia), supra
note 24. In this case, Australia challenged an EC labeling requirement for geographic
indications as inconsistent with the national treatment obligation under TBT Article
2.1. Id. 7.426. The Panel found that Australia did not make a prima facie case that
the EC measure accorded any difference in treatment to imported products and like
products of EC origin. Id. I 7.464-7.475. Given this finding, the Panel considered it
unnecessary to examine whether the products involved were "like." Id. 7.463. The
same EC labeling requirement was also challenged under the national treatment
provisions of TRIPS Article 3.1 and GATT Article III:4 by the United States. See
7.482, 7.500. Similarly,
Panel Report, EC-Trademarks/GIs (U.S.), supra note 24,
the Panel found that the United States did not make a prima facie case that the EC
measure accorded any difference in treatment to different nationals under TRIPS
Article 3.1 or to like products under GATT Article III:4. Id. 1 7.497-7.499, 7.5087.509.
229 In addition, similar language of nondiscrimination also appears in the preamble
of the SPS Agreement. See SPS Agreement, supra note 6, pmbl., cl. 1.

274

BOSTON UNIVERSITY INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 23:215

The first of the two SPS provisions is Article 2.3, which sets out a general obligation of nondiscrimination:
Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures
do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members
where identical or similar conditions prevail, including between their
own territory and that of other Members. Sanitary and phytosanitary
measures shall not be applied in a manner which would constitute a
disguised restriction on international trade.2 3 ° (emphasis added)
The second provision is found in Article 5.5, which contains a more
specific obligation of nondiscrimination:
With the objective of achieving consistency in the application of the
concept of appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection
against risks to human life or health, or to animal and plant life or
health, each Member shall avoid arbitraryor unjustifiable distinctions
in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations, if
such distinctions result in discriminationor a disguised restriction on
international trade. (emphasis added)
The Appellate Body has construed Article 5.5 as a subsidiary rule of Article 2.3,231 and that a violation of Article 5.5 necessarily implies a violation
of Article 2.3.232
Clearly, a finding of discrimination under either of the two provisions
will be predicated on a similarity comparison. For Article 2.3, a comparison must be made between treatment of Members with "identical or similar conditions"; for Article 5.5, a comparison between different levels of
sanitary protection applied by a Member in different situations. Thus far,
there has been more elaboration of Article 5.5 than Article 2.3 in WTO
jurisprudence, as will be discussed below.
Before delving into the SPS cases, it is important to note that, despite
the pattern of their wording, the SPS provisions of nondiscrimination
have a very different field of application from that of the chapeau of
GATT Article XX. According to the Appellate Body, Article 2.3 of the
SPS Agreement "takes up obligations similar to those arising under
[GATT] Article 1:1 and Article 111:4," as well as "incorporates part of the
'chapeau' of Article XX."'23 3 This interpretation suggests that the SPS
obligation of nondiscrimination, while encompassing elements of all three
GATT provisions, is independent of GATT MFN or NT provisions and
230 SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.3.
231 Article 5.5 is to be read in the context of Article 2.3 and "may be seen to be

marking out and elaborating a particular route leading to the same destination set out
in Article 2.3." Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, $ 212.
232 Appellate Body Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon,
252, WT/DS18/AB/R (Oct. 20, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6 1998) [hereinafter
Australia-Salmon].
233 Id.
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Article XX. The independent character of the SPS obligation stems from
the relationship of the SPS Agreement with GATT. Although designed to
elaborate rules for the application of GATT to SPS measures and in particular the provisions of Article XX(b), 3 4 the SPS Agreement is legally a
separate agreement from GATT. The substantive obligations of the SPS
Agreement "go significantly beyond and are additional to" the requirements for invocation of Article XX(b). 23 ' And such obligations are not
imposed, as is the case of Article XX(b), to justify a violation of another
GATT obligation.23 6
1.

Leading Cases Involving Interpretation of Article 5.5

Article 5.5 has been interpreted in EC-Hormones23 7 and Austra-

lia-Salmon.238 In EC-Hormones,the challenged measures were EC regulations prohibiting the sale and importation of meat and meat products
that had been treated with growth hormones.2 39 Canada and the United
States argued that the EC measures were inconsistent with various provisions of the SPS Agreement, including Article 5.5. While the Appellate
Body ultimately held that the EC measures were inconsistent with the
requirements of the SPS Agreement, it reversed the Panel's finding that
such measures violated Article 5.5.240 According to the AB, a violation of
Article 5.5 requires the presence of three distinct elements: (i) the Member imposing the SPS measure at issue has adopted different levels of
sanitary protection in different but "comparable situations"; (ii) those
levels of protection exhibit arbitrary or unjustifiable differences in their
treatment of these situations; and (iii) the arbitrary or unjustifiable differences result in discrimination between Members or a disguised restriction
on international trade. 241' The AB did not explain how the first element
234 See SPS Agreement, supra note 6, pmbl., cl. 8.
235 Panel Report, EC-MeasuresAffecting Meat and Meat Products, (Hormones),
8.38, WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997) (adopted Feb. 13, 1998, as modified by
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R) [hereinafter Panel
Report, EC-Hormones (USA)]; Panel Report, EC-Measures Affecting Meat and

Meat Products (Hormones), 8.41, WT/DS48/R/CAN (Aug. 18, 1997) (adopted Feb.
13, 1998, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R)
[hereinafter Panel Report, EC-Hormones (CAN)].
236 Id. While an SPS measure conforming to the SPS Agreement is presumed to
comply with Article XX(b) of GATT, the converse is not true. See SPS Agreement,
supra note 6, art. 2.4. For comment on the relationship between the SPS Agreement
and the GATT, see R. Quick & A. Bluthner, Has the Appellate Body Erred? An
Appraisal and Criticism of the Ruling in the WTO Hormones Case, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L.
4, 603 (1999).
237 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76.
231 See Appellate Body Report, Australia-Salmon, supra note 232.
239 See Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, IT 2-5.
240 Id.
253.
241 Id. 1 214.
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should be determined; instead, it implicitly accepted the Panel's conclusions as to the comparability of the situations involved.24 2 With respect to
the second element, the AB found that the different levels of sanitary
protection set by the EC for meat (beef) treated with growth hormones
as compared with meat (pork) treated with antimicrobial agents were
unjustifiable. 24" Although they all involve the same health risk (carcinogenicity), growth hormones were banned while antimicrobial agents were
allowed. Despite these two findings, however, the AB concluded under
the third element that the unjustifiable distinction in the EC levels of
protection did not result in discrimination between Members or a disguised restriction on international trade.2 44 In reaching this conclusion,
the AB relied on its assessment that the EC regulations had legitimate
purposes and were genuinely designed to protect its population from the
risk of cancer.2 45
In Australia-Salmon, the SPS measures at issue were import restrictions imposed by Australia on salmon from Canada. 246 Australia had
identified 24 "disease agents" associated with North American salmon
and considered them a threat to the health of the Australian salmon population. Accordingly, Australia prohibited importation of salmon from
North America unless they had been heat-treated, which would eliminate
the risk of disease. Canada challenged the import prohibition as inconsistent with various provisions of the SPS Agreement, including Article 5.5.
Following the AB's statement in EC-Hormones regarding the three elements under Article 5.5, the Panel made detailed analysis with respect to
each of them.24 7 It first found that Australia, while banning imports of
Canadian salmon due to certain disease agents, permitted imports of herring and finfish, which are known to host the same diseases. Such differences in the treatment of salmon and other fish, according to the Panel,
were arbitrary or unjustifiable given the evidence that there was a higher
risk, or at least as high a risk, of disease introduction associated with herring and finfish as compared with Canadian salmon. The Panel further
found that such differences resulted in "a disguised restriction on international trade."24' 8 This last finding was based on the cumulative consideration of several factors, one of which was that Australia had made a
substantial but unexplained change in its conclusion between the draft
report of import risk analysis issued in 1995, which recommended
Id. $ 216-218; see infra Section IV.C.2.
Id. 1 226-235.
246.
244 Id.
245 Id. $$ 244-246.
246 See Panel Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon, $$ 2.12.30, WT/DS18//R (June 12, 1998) (adopted Nov. 6, 1998, as upheld by Appellate
Body Report, WT/DS18/AB/R) [hereinafter Panel Report, Australia-Salmon].
247 See id. $ l 8.108-8.159.
248 Id. $ 8.159.
242
243
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allowing the importation of Canadian salmon under certain conditions,
and the final report in 1996, which recommended continuing the import
prohibition. The Panel stated that the unexplained change in its conclusion "might well have been inspired by domestic pressures to protect the
Australian salmon industry against import competition."2'49 The Panel's
finding under Article 5.5 was upheld by the AB with only a minor modification in analysis.2 5 By implication, Australia was also found to have violated Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement. 2 5 '
2. The "Comparable Situations" Analysis
The examination of the first element under Article 5.5 requires a determination whether different levels of protection are provided in different
but comparable situations. The issue is essentially whether different treatment is accorded to similar situations, an inquiry that conceptually
involves the same type of likeness analysis as that involved in the context
of like products or like conditions.
In EC-Hormones, the Panel first interpreted situations as comparable
if they involved the "same substance" or the "same adverse health

effect."25' 2 The EC appealed this interpretation, arguing that such common element was not necessarily sufficient to ensure a rational comparison.253 Rather than addressing whether the Panel had properly defined
the "comparable situations," the AB decided that there was no need to
examine the matter in any length. 5 4 Instead, it stated summarily: "The
situations exhibiting differing levels of protection cannot, of course, be
compared unless they are comparable, that is, unless they present some
common element or elements sufficient to render them comparable." '5 5
The AB's statement, however, provides little interpretive guidance since
it failed to discuss the criteria for choosing the relevant elements for
comparison.
The question of what renders situations comparable under Article 5.5
can be readily addressed by applying the similarly-situated analysis. Once
again, the relevant elements for comparison must be factors that are useful in furthering the goal of the provision. As evident from its text, Article
5.5 is designed to detect inconsistencies in trade protection provided by
SPS measures, since adopting different levels of protection against the
same or similar levels of sanitary risks may indicate that the SPS measures in question are unnecessary and constitute a disguised restriction on

250

8.154.
Appellate Body Report, Australia-Salmon, supra note 232, TT 143-177.

251

Id. T 178.

249

Id.

Panel Report, EC-Hormones (USA), supra note 235, T 8.176; Panel Report,
EC-Hormones (CAN), supra note 235, 8.179.
216.
253 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76,
252

254

Id.

255

Id.

217.
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international trade.25 6 Given this purpose, the basis for comparison
should be the risks against which the SPS measures at issue were adopted.
In other words, whether situations are similar or comparable with respect
to the purpose of Article 5.5 depends on whether they involve the same
or similar levels of risks to human, animal or plant life or health. If different levels of protection are provided to products presenting the same or
similar levels of risks, there is an inconsistency in the use of SPS measures. That is so, irrespective of whether the products involved are "like"
or are of any national origins. Although the risks targeted by SPS measures vary from case to case and the perception of what constitutes a
health risk evolves over time, a certain health risk ought to be the indispensable common element that renders situations comparable for the
purpose of Article 5.5.
In light of the above analysis, the use of the "same substance" as the
basis for comparison between different situations is conceptually problematic, because the same substance may or may not present the same
health risk depending on the circumstances. For example, the Panel in
EC-Hormones found that the EC's ban on natural hormones injected as
growth promoters was arbitrary and unjustifiable because they were the
same substance as the hormones occurring naturally in meat, which was
not regulated. This comparison was apparently erroneous since there was
no reason to believe that injected natural hormones should have the same
health effect as naturally-occurring hormones.25 7 The AB reversed the
Panel's finding, recognizing that there was a fundamental distinction
between added hormones and naturally-occurring hormones in meat.2 58
The AB's reversal, however, was not based on the ground that the two
situations were incomparable due to the differences in health risks
involved. Rather, the AB reasoned that the EC would have to incur an
incredible regulatory burden if it were to regulate the effect of naturallyoccurring hormones in foods.2 59
See Quick & Bluthner, supra note 236, at 620.
Whether they present the same or similar levels of risk is an issue relating to
risk assessment. In this case, the AB upheld the Panel's finding that the EC measure
was not based on a risk assessment as required by Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement,
since the EC had not actually performed such risk assessment. See Appellate Body
Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, c1 208. Given that cognition of health risks is a
progressive process, the comparison can only be made on the basis of perceived risks
at the time. The issue of what constitutes risk against which SPS measures can be
taken is at the heart of the entire regime of the SPS Agreement and is beyond the
scope of this paper.
258 Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, 221.
259 The AB reasoned that to require the EC to regulate naturally-occurring
hormones in food would "entail such a comprehensive and massive governmental
intervention'in nature and in the ordinary lives of people as to reduce the comparison
itself to an absurdity." Id. Here, the AB appears to have confused the issue of
256
257
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In essence, using the "same substance" as the basis for defining "comparable situations" under Article 5.5 is similar to using the physical characteristics of products as the basis for defining "like products" under the
MFN and NT provisions. In both contexts, the comparison is rendered
impotent without referring to the goal of the underlying rule. Fortunately,
the analysis of comparable situations under Article 5.5 improved significantly in Australia-Salmon.There, the Panel focused on the sanitary risks
targeted by the Australian ban on the imports of Canadian salmon, and
found that the imports of herring and finfish and the imports of Canadian
salmon were comparable situations because they represented the same
kinds of risks to the Australian salmon population.26 ° The Appellate
Body upheld the Panel's finding.2 6 '
3.

Regulatory Purposes and Standards of Review under Article 5.5

The application of Article 5.5 in the two cases has produced opposite
outcomes: the EC ban on hormone-treated beef was held not in violation
of the article, whereas the Australia ban on Canadian salmon was held to
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade in violation of the
article. The divergent results came despite the fact that, under the analysis of the first and second elements of Article 5.5, both bans were found
to draw "arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions" in the levels of protection
provided in comparable situations. 26 2 It was the findings under the third
element of Article 5.5 that made the difference in the outcomes. Apparently, the decisive factor was the perceived regulatory intent or purposes
of the SPS measures at issue. While the EC was able to demonstrate to
the satisfaction of the tribunal that it had sufficient non-protectionist reasons to impose the ban on the import of hormone-treated beef, Australia
was unable to do so with respect to its ban on the import of Canadian
salmon.
Hence, it seems that the AB not only is willing to consider legislative
intent, 63 but has solely relied on the perceived regulatory purpose, in its
finding of discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade under Article
situation comparability under the first element of Article 5.5 with the issue of whether
the distinction in treatment is "arbitrary or unjustifiable" under the second element.
260 Panel Report, Australia-Salmon, supra note 246, $ 8.121.
261 See supra note 250.
262 According to the AB, the arbitrary or unjustifiable distinction in the levels of
production "is only an element of (indirect) proof that a Member may actually be
applying an SPS measure in a manner that discriminates between Members or
constitutes a disguised restriction on international trade"; whether the unjustifiable
distinctions result in discrimination between Members or a disguised trade restriction
"must be sought in the circumstances of each individual case." Appellate Body

Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76,

240.

Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, 1
the legislative intent of the EC in enacting the ban).
263

243-245 (discussing
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5.5 (and by implication a finding of discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade under Article 2.3). The AB's attention to legislative intent
in SPS cases marks a sharp contrast with its unwillingness to consider
regulatory purposes in the likeness decision under GAIT Article 111264
and its ambivalent position on whether the policy objective of a measure
2 65
should be taken into account under the chapeau of Article XX.
It also seems that the AB has applied a less strict standard of scrutiny
under Article 5.5 with respect to an origin-neutral measure having a bona
fide regulatory purpose. Under the SPS Agreement, a Member is
required to apply SPS measures "only to the extent necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health., 266 Nonetheless, in determining
whether the EC ban resulted in discrimination between Members in
EC-Hormones, the AB apparently deferred to the non-protectionist purpose of the ban, rather than focusing on whether the ban was necessary to
protect human health.26 7 Although the EC measure was ultimately held
to be inconsistent with the SPS Agreement on different grounds, 268 it is
interesting to note that, with respect to the issue of defining discrimination, the standard of scrutiny applied in EC-Hormones appears to be
more lenient than that applied under the chapeau of Article XX in
U.S.-Shrimp, which also involved an origin-neutral measure with a nonprotectionist purpose.2 9
4. Interpretation of Article 2.3
Australia-Salmon (Article 21.5)"0 is the only case so far that interprets
the elements of the nondiscrimination requirement of Article 2.3. The
case concerns a subsequent dispute over Australia's implementation of
the rulings in Australia-Salmon.Canada claimed that Australia had failed
to impose a stricter control over the internal movement of Australian fish
as compared to its control over the import of Canadian salmon, and that
such practice constituted discrimination between Australia and Canada
under Article 2.3.271 In addressing this claim, the Panel considered AusSee supra Section III.B.1.
See supra text at notes 194-195
266 SPS Agreement, supra note 6, art. 2.2.
267 The AB held that it was not necessary in this case to make a finding on whether
264
265

Article 2.2 was violated since a finding had been made under Article 5.1 which was
informed by, and provides more specific rights and obligations than, Article 2.2. See
Appellate Body Report, EC-Hormones, supra note 76, 1 250.
268 See supra note 257.
269 See supra text at notes 209-13.
270 Panel Report, Australia-MeasuresAffecting Importation of Salmon - Recourse
to Article 21.5 by Canada, WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000) (adopted March 20, 2000)
[hereinafter, Australia-Salmon (Article 21.5)]
271 Id. T17.109. Canada made a similar claim in the original dispute that Australia
failed to impose control over the internal movement of Australian fish from infected
states to disease-free states while prohibiting importation of Canadian salmon, and
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tralia's explanation that the risk of disease associated with the internal
movement of Australian fish was different from that associated with
imported salmon.27 2 It expressed doubts as to whether "identical or similar conditions" prevailed in the territories of both Australia and Canada
within the meaning of Article 2.3, noting "the substantial difference in
disease status" between the two countries.273 Accordingly, the Panel held
that Canada did not meet its burden of demonstrating that Australia discriminated against Canada arbitrarily or unjustifiably under Article
2.3.274

The Panel in this case used the risk of diseases associated with
imported salmon as the basis for comparing conditions under Article 2.3,
an approach that is sound in light of the similarly situated analysis. If the
goal of Article 2.3 is to ensure that Members will take SPS measures
solely for the purpose of protecting human, animal or plant life or health,
and not for protectionist reasons, the criteria for determining whether
"identical or similar conditions" prevailed between the countries concerned must center on the sanitary risk targeted by the SPS measure at
issue.
D. Nondiscrimination under the Enabling Clause
Preferential treatment of developing countries is one of the major
exceptions to the GATT MFN principle. The legal basis for this exception
is set out comprehensively in the 1979 GATT Decision on Differential
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, 275 known as the Enabling Clause, which became
an integral part of GATF 1994 under the WTO Agreement.2 76 The Enabling Clause provides that "notwithstanding" the MIFN obligation under
GATT Article I, Members "may accord differential and more favorable
treatment to developing countries, without according such treatment to
other [Members]. 2 77
that the difference in treatment constituted discrimination within the meaning of
Article 2.3. The Panel saw no need to examine the discrimination claim after it found
that the Australian measure constituted a disguised restriction on international trade.
Panel Report, Australia-Salmon, supra note 246, 8.184.
272 Panel Report, Australia-Salmon (Article 21.5), supra note 270,
7.93.
273 Id. 7.113.
274 Id.
275 Differential
and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller
Participation of Developing Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903 (Nov. 28 1979), B.I.S.D
(26th Supp.) 203 (1980) [hereinafter the Enabling Clause].
276 The
Enabling Clause constitutes one of "other decisions of the
CONTRACTING PARTIES" within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)(iv) of the
language of Annex 1A incorporating the GATT 1994 into the WTO Agreement.
277 Enabling Clause, supra note 275, paragraph 1.
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A primary form of such treatment is the grant of preferential tariffs by
developed Members to products of developing countries in accordance
with the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Drawn up by the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in
the late 1960's, the GSP was envisioned as "a mutually acceptable system
of generalized, non-reciprocal, non-discriminatory preferences beneficial
to the developing countries in order to increase the export earnings, to
promote the industrialization, and to accelerate the rates of economic
growth of these countries."2'78 The GSP programs are voluntarily adopted
and individually designed by developed countries under their domestic
laws. In practice, preference-giving countries have imposed various limitations on the product coverage and eligibility of beneficiaries under their
GSP programs.2 79 While some of the eligibility criteria are based on economic factors, such as requiring more advanced developing countries to
"graduate" from the GSP program and granting greater benefits to the
least developed countries, others are motivated by political and national
interest considerations. For example, the United States excludes eight
categories of countries from GSP benefits, which include countries that
are "communist" (with exceptions), that aid or abet terrorism, that fail to
enforce arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens, that expropriate the
property of U.S. citizens, including intellectual property, without just
compensation, and that fail to comply with international labor standards.2 8 ' The beneficiary eligibility requirements inevitably result in differentiation among developing countries, calling into question whether
such programs are truly "nonreciprocal" and "nondiscriminatory." However, given the voluntary nature of the GSP programs, it was not clear,
before the WTO decision in EC-Preferences,"l whether the "generalized, non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory" characteristics of the GSP
were legally binding.
1. Interpretation of "Non-Discriminatory" in EC-Preferences
The issue of non-discriminatory treatment of GSP beneficiaries is at
the heart of the dispute in EC-Preferences. In this case, India challenged
a special program of EU's GSP that accorded special tariff preferences to
twelve specific developing countries affected by drug production and traf278 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11, T 144. For a discussion
of the origin of the GSP, see Panel Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the
Granting of Tariff Preferencesto Developing Countries, 7.64, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1,
2003) (adopted Apr. 20, 2004, as modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS246/AB/
R) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC-Preferences].
279 See Gene M. Grossman & Alan 0. Sykes, A Preferencefor Development the
Law and Economics of GSP, 4 WORLD TRADE REV. 41, 43-47 (2005), for a
description of the U.S. and EU GSP programs.
280 19 U.S.C §.2462(b) (2005).
281 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11.
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ficking (the Drug Arrangements). According to India, the Enabling
Clause imposed a nondiscrimination obligation on preference-giving
countries, which prohibited them from differentiating between beneficiary countries, subject only to the exceptions set out in the Enabling
Clause.28 2 Because the Drug Arrangements did not fall into those exceptions, India contended that the EU scheme was unjustifiable under the
Enabling Clause and therefore violated GATT Article 1:1.
The term "nondiscriminatory" appears in footnote 3 of the Enabling
Clause, which qualifies the term "Generalized System of Preferences" in
paragraph 2(a) "[a]s described in the Decision of the CONTRACTING
PARTIES of 25 June 1971, relating to the establishment of 'generalized,
non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory preferences beneficial to the
development countries'., 283 Two key questions were raised in the interpretation of footnote 3: first, whether the term "non-discriminatory"
imposes a legal obligation on preference-giving countries or merely provides a cross-reference to the description of GSP; and second, if a legal
obligation of nondiscrimination is so imposed, whether such obligation
requires preference-giving countries to grant the same tariff preferences
to all GSP beneficiaries. The Panel in this case answered both questions
in the affirmative, finding that "the term 'non-discriminatory' in footnote
3 requires that identical tariff preferences under GSP schemes be provided to all developing countries without
differentiation, except for the
' 284
implementation of a priori limitations. ,
On appeal, the Appellate Body agreed with the Panel on the first question, but reversed the Panel's finding on the second. The AB affirmed
that there is a legal obligation of nondiscrimination imposed on the preference-granting countries under the Enabling Clause.28 5 This holding is
significant in that it confirmed for the first time that GSP programs are
subject to WTO multilateral disciplines despite being voluntary in
nature.2 86 Nonetheless, the Appellate Body disagreed with the Panel's
282 The exceptions set out in the Enabling Clause include differentiation among
GSP beneficiaries for the purpose of providing special treatment to the leastdeveloped countries pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of the Enabling Clause, and setting a
priori import ceilings for products of individual developing countries reaching a
certain competitive level. See Panel Report, EC-Preferences, supra note 278, at
7.116.
283 The Enabling Clause, supra note 275, n.3. The 1971 Decision referred to in
footnote 3 contained the initial waiver of GATT Article I obligation with respect to
the GSP for ten years. GATI Doc. L/3545 (June 25, 1971), B.I.S.D. (18th Supp.) 24
(1972).
284 Panel Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 278,
7.176.
285 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11, %%143-147.
286 See Grossman & Sykes, supra note 279, at 63-65 (pointing out reasons for the
WTO to regulate the GSP, such as limiting negative international externalities
generated by GSP, despite that GSP is a gift in nature). For an opposing view, see
Robert Howse, India's WTO Challenge to Drug Enforcement Conditions in the
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finding that this nondiscrimination obligation requires the grant of identical tariff preferences to all developing countries without differentiation.
Instead, the AB held that preference-granting Members are required
only to "ensure that identical treatment is available to all similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries, that is, to all GSP beneficiaries that have the
'development, financial and trade needs' to which the treatment in question is intended to respond." ' Applying this standard, the AB found
that the Drug Arrangements were inconsistent with the non-discriminatory requirement of the Enabling Clause because they had failed to set
any objective criteria that would allow all developing countries that "are
similarly affected by the drug problem" to become beneficiaries
88
thereunder.
The AB decision in this case is a significant development in WTO jurisprudence on nondiscrimination, for this was the first time that the generic
term "non-discriminatory" was interpreted as a requirement to treat similarly-situated Members similarly without the aid of any specific treaty
language to that effect. Unlike GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV or
Article 2.3 of the SPS Agreement, in which the term "discrimination" is
followed by a defining phrase "between countries where the same (or like
or similar) conditions prevail," the text of the Enabling Clause does not
provide any qualifying language for the term "non-discriminatory." The
content of this nondiscrimination obligation, therefore, is completely
open to interpretation.
The AB began the interpretation of the term "nondiscrimination" by
examining its ordinary meanings. Upon acknowledging that the term
"discriminate" can convey both a neutral meaning of making a distinction
and a negative connotation of a distinction that is unjust or prejudicial,
the AB concluded: "Whether the drawing of distinctions is per se discriminatory, or whether it is discriminatory only if done on an improper basis,
the ordinary meanings of 'discriminate' converge in one important
respect: they both suggest that distinguishing among similarly-situated
beneficiaries is discriminatory., 289 According to the AB, both India and
EU agreed that similarly-situated GSP beneficiaries should not be treated
differently, and they disagreed only "as to the basis for determining
whether beneficiaries are similarly-situated." 2 9 While India's argument
suggested that all GSP beneficiaries should be deemed as similarly-situEuropean Community Generalized System of Preferences:A Little Known Case with
Major Repercussions for 'Political' Conditionality in US Trade Policy, 4 CHI. J. INT'L
L. 385 (2003); and Robert Howse, et al, Internet Roundtable: The Appellate Body's
GSP Decision, 3 World Trade Rev. 239, 246 (2004) (arguing that nondiscrimination is
not a binding legal obligation under the Enabling Clause).
287 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11,
173.
288 Id. IT 180-189.
289 Id.
153.
290 Id.
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ated under a Member's scheme, EU believed that GSP beneficiaries were
29 1
similarly-situated only when they had "similar development needs."
The central issue raised here is whether the nondiscrimination obligation of the Enabling Clause permits the preference-giving Member to
draw distinctions among GSP beneficiaries based on a need shared only
by a subgroup of the beneficiaries. The Panel and the AB reached opposite conclusions on this issue. Because the differing approaches taken by
the Panel and the AB bear upon the "similarly-situated" analysis, both
their views are discussed below.
A major difference of opinion between the Panel and the AB appears
in their interpretation of paragraph 3(c) of the Enabling Clause, to which
both the Panel and the AB paid special attention as part of the relevant
context for the term "nondiscriminatory., 292 Paragraph 3(c) provides:
Any differential and more favorable treatment provided under
this clause ... shall in the case of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to developing countries be designed and, if
necessary, modified to respond positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries. (emphasis added)
Evidently, this provision is most relevant to the interpretation of the
"nondiscriminatory" obligation because it embodies the purpose of the
GSP and in turn the purpose of the Enabling Clause. The critical issue in
interpreting paragraph 3(c) is to determine whether "the development,
financial and trade needs of developing countries" refer to the needs of
all developing countries or the needs of selected individual developing
countries. The text is ambiguous.
In resolving this ambiguity, the Panel chose to interpret "the development, financial and trade needs of developing countries" to mean the
needs of all developing countries. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel
examined the origin and drafting history of the Enabling Clause. The
Panel found that nothing in the drafting history supported the view that
paragraph 3(c) permitted preference-giving countries to respond to the
needs of selected developing countries.2 9 3 Moreover, the Panel believed
that "[tihere is no reasonable basis to distinguish between different types
of development needs, whether they are caused by drug production and
trafficking, or by poverty, natural disasters, political turmoil, poor education, the spread of epidemics, the magnitude of the population, or by
other problems., 294 Given the practical difficulties in elaborating any reasonable "objective criteria," the Panel concluded that differentiation
between GSP beneficiaries could not have been intended by the Enabling
291

Id.
Both

tribunals discussed paragraph 3(c) in length. See Panel Report,
EC-Preferences, supra note 278,
I 7.66-7.116; Appellate Body Report,
EC-Preferences,supra note 11,
157-165.
293 Panel Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 278,
7.100.
294 Id.
7.103.
292
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Clause except where explicitly stated in the Clause.29 5 Furthermore, the
Panel expressed the view that to allow differentiation among GSP beneficiaries according to their individual needs would lead to "the collapse of
the whole GSP system and a return back to special preferences favoring
the situation that negotiators
selected developing countries, precisely
2 96
aimed to eliminate in the late 1960's.
By contrast, the AB interpreted paragraph 3(c) to mean that preference-granting countries may respond to needs that are common only to
some but not all developing countries. According to the AB, since the
very purpose of the special and differential treatment permitted under
the Enabling Clause is to foster economic development of developing
countries, and since such development will not be in lockstep for all
developing countries, the "needs of developing countries" should be
understood to mean varying needs of developing countries at the different stages of economic development. The AB found support for this view
in paragraph 7 of the Enabling Clause, which refers to the "progressive
development" of the economies of developing countries, and the Preamble to the WTO Agreement, which recognizes the need for positive
efforts designed to ensure that developing countries secure a share in the
growth in international trade "commensurate with the needs of their economic development., 297 The AB then explained that a development
"need" cannot be based merely on an assertion by a preference-granting
country or a beneficiary country; rather, it must be assessed according to
an objective standard. 29" Disagreeing with the Panel's belief that no reasonable objective standard for differentiating development needs could
be elaborated, the AB stated that "[b]road-based recognition of a particular need, set out in the WTO Agreement or in multilateral instruments
adopted by international organizations, could serve as such a standard." '9 9 As to the Panel's view that allowing differentiation among GSP
beneficiaries would result in the collapse of the GSP system, the AB
responded by stating that such a conclusion was "unwarranted" and that
the Enabling Clause contained sufficient conditions on the granting of
preferences to protect against such an outcome. °°
295
296
297
298
299

300

Id. 7.104.
Id. 7.102.
See Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11, T 160-161.
Id. I 163.
Id.
Id. 156. According to the AB, for example, the term "generalized" requires

the GSP schemes of preference-giving countries remain "generally applicable." The
AB, however, did not explain why the drug preferences should be considered a
"generally applicable" GSP scheme. Given that only a subset of developing countries
are ever affected by the drug problem, it is difficult to see how the drug preferences
can be viewed as generally applicable to developing countries. Making the preferences
de jure available to all developing countries that are similarly affected by the drug
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The divergent conclusions drawn by the Panel and the AB from the
ambiguous text of paragraph 3(c) reflect the different values that the
Panel and the AB placed on the GSP and the developing country exception to the MFN principle. When the determination of the proper basis
for classification involves a normative decision, as was the case here, the
relevant values held by the tribunal will determine the outcome, as will be
shown below.
2.

Applying the Similarly-Situated Analysis

Applying the similarly-situated analysis to this case provides a conceptual perspective to the tribunals' interpretations of the nondiscrimination
obligation of the Enabling Clause. As indicated above, the central question raised in this case is whether the Enabling Clause permits the classification of a subgroup of GSP beneficiaries as "similarly situated" on the
basis of a specific need shared by them. In order to answer this question,
one must first identify the purpose of the Enabling Clause that contains
the nondiscrimination obligation. To be relevant, a criterion for drawing
distinctions between GSP beneficiaries must be conducive to or useful in
furthering that purpose. Unless the criterion is indispensable for achieving that purpose, however, whether to allow it in determining similarity
between the beneficiaries is a matter of normative judgment.
(a) The Purpose of the Enabling Clause
The Appellate Body has recognized two objectives of the Enabling
Clause in this case. First, the Enabling Clause enables developed countries to provide preferential treatment to developing countries so as to
"foster economic development of developing countries."' ' This objective
is based on the assumption that developing countries have different economic and trade needs from developed countries and that such special
needs can be addressed through tariff and other preferential treatment
permitted under the Enabling Clause. This objective is also embodied in
the provision of paragraph 3(c) which, as indicated above, requires that
any special treatment provided under the Clause be designed "to respond
positively to the development, financial and trade needs of developing
countries."
Second, the Enabling Clause was intended to address the then-existing
"special" preferences granted by developed countries to selected developing countries. Prior to the UNCTAD negotiations, there had been a
patchwork of discriminatory preferences in the trade policies of developed nations that were largely based on colonial ties.3" 2 Such discriminatory preferences gave rise to the same type of problems addressed by the
problem, as the EC should have done in the AB's opinion, will not change the lack of
general applicability of this criterion.
301 Id. T 160.
302 Grossman & Sykes, supra note 279, at 53.
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MTN obligation.3" 3 The "generalized system of preferences" drawn up by
the UNCTAD was designed to replace the historical patchwork of discriminatory preferences. As the AB acknowledged, "one of the objectives
of the 1971 Waiver Decision and the Enabling Clause was to eliminate
the fragmented system of special preferences that were, in general, based
on historical and political ties between developed countries and their former colonies."3" 4 This objective underscores the "generalized" and "nondiscriminatory" requirements of the GSP.
(b) Relevance of the Drug Criterion
In view of these two objectives of the Enabling Clause, whether a subgroup of developing countries may be classified as similarly-situated on
the basis of drug problems will depend on whether using the drug criterion serves to advance these two objectives. In order to determine
whether the drug criterion furthers the objective of fostering economic
development of the drug-affected countries, it will be necessary to assess
whether the drug problem experienced by these countries can be alleviated by the new market access created by tariff preferences. Indeed, the
AB has articulated the following standard: "In the context of a GSP
scheme, the particular need at issue must, by its nature, be such that it can
be effectively addressed through tariff preferences."3 5 Despite this articulation, however, the AB did not proceed to examine whether the particular need of the drug-affected countries can be effectively addressed
through tariff preferences, on the ground that the Panel had made no
finding on the issue.3" 6 As a result, in reaching the conclusion that the
drug criterion is not discriminatory, the AB had simply assumed the efficacy of tariff preferences in combating the drug problem. 0 7 Based on this
303

Id. at 64 (indicating that the arguments for limiting differential treatment in

GSP schemes parallel those that have made by economists and legal scholars to justify
the MFN rule in GATT).
304 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences, supra note 11, T 155 (footnote
omitted).
305 Id.
164.
306 Id.
[ 178-179 (stating that the Panel did not determine whether the Drug
Arrangements satisfy the conditions set out in paragraph 3(c)). It should be noted
that the Panel assessed the role of tariff preferences in combating the drug problem in
the context of discussing whether the EC drug program was designed to protect
human life and health within the meaning of GATT Article XX(b). The Panel was of
the view that the market access created by additional tariff preferences "plays a
supportive role" in relation to alternative development, but "is not itself a significant
component" of the comprehensive strategy of the United Nations to combat drugs.
See Panel Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 278, 7.206.
307 Cf. Grossman & Sykes, supra note 279, at 55-56 (suggesting that "the drugrelated preferences were enacted for the benefit of Europe, to reward cooperation in
its efforts to reduce traffic in drugs toward Europe, rather than to assist the
beneficiaries in addressing any perceived 'development need' of their own.").
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assumption, of course, one can logically conclude that the drug criterion
is conducive to furthering the first objective of the Enabling Clause.
Examining the drug criterion against the second objective of the Enabling Clause is rather straightforward. If the elimination of a "fragmented
system of special preferences" is the goal, then allowing the grant of special preferences to some but not all GSP beneficiaries (with the exceptions explicitly provided in the Enabling Clause) will be inconsistent with
this goal because it necessarily leads to the fragmentation of the system.
Therefore, the drug criterion detracts from, rather than serves, the second
objective of the Enabling Clause.
Based on the above analysis, one can conclude that the drug criterion
for classifying GSP beneficiaries is (presumably) conducive to furthering
the first, but not the second, objective of the Enabling Clause. This inconsistency stems from the tension between the two objectives as interpreted
by the AB. Once the AB construed paragraph 3(c) as authorizing the
preference-giving country to respond to different needs of individual
developing countries, it introduced a conflict between the two objectives
of the Enabling Clause, since granting preferences according to the need
shared by selected beneficiaries would inevitably lead to fragmentation of
the system.
(c) The Normative Decisions and Standards of Review
When there is a potential conflict between the two objectives of the
Enabling Clause, the tribunals face a normative decision as to which of
the two objectives ought to be the primary one in interpreting the term
"nondiscrimination." In this instance, the Panel and the AB made different choices.
The Panel was evidently more concerned with the potential fragmentation and abuse of the GSP system. Under the Panel's interpretation, all
beneficiaries of a GSP program must receive identical preferences, except
for the limited differentiation explicitly permitted by the Enabling
Clause. This interpretation would have the effect of preserving the MFN
norm within the GSP system. The Panel's view is apparently in line with
the substantial doubts raised by economists about the wisdom of the GSP
programs as currently implemented 30 8 and the concern shared by many
For a summary of criticism of the GSP as implemented, see THE FUTURE OF
THE WTO, Addressing institutionalchallenges in the new millennium, Report by the
Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi (2005),
93101, available at www.wto.org. The major arguments of the critics include concerns
that developing countries have been burdened with conditions unrelated to trade
imposed by the preference-granting countries, that the product coverage and
preference margins in GSP schemes are determined by the preference-giving
countries rather than by the need of developing countries, that empirical studies have
shown little benefits have in fact accrued to developing countries under the GSP, and
that GSP beneficiaries tend to become over-reliant on preferences or trapped by the
nature of the system at the expense of industrial and agricultural diversification. See
also Grossman & Sykes, supra note 279, at 57-66, for an economic analysis of tariff
308
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that the world trading system faces a grave danger of fragmentation due
to serious erosions of the MFN principle. 3 9 Hence, while acknowledging
that one of the WTO objectives is to secure for the developing countries a
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with their development needs, the Panel emphasized the WTO objective of promoting
general liberalization of trade and the function of the nondiscrimination
principle in achieving that objective. According to the Panel, the function
of the term "non-discriminatory" in footnote 3 is to prevent abuse caused
by discrimination in granting GSP benefits; and given that function, the
objective of promoting general trade liberalization "contributes more to
guiding the interpretation of "non-discriminatory" than the objective of
promoting the trade of developing countries. 1l On the whole, the Panel's
opinion is more rooted in the economic rationale of the nondiscrimination principle.
In comparison, the AB appears to be much less concerned with a fragmented GSP system and more willing to assume the positive impact of
GSP on the economic development of developing countries. The AB reasoned: "An interpretation of 'non-discriminatory" that does not require
the granting of 'identical tariff preferences' allows not only for GSP
schemes providing preferential market access to all beneficiaries, but also
the possibility of additionalpreference for developing countries with particular needs.",3 11 (emphasis added) As a result, the AB also appears to
be more sensitive to the political reality of the GSP system. 312 Given that
the existing GSP programs impose various eligibility criteria on the beneficiaries, a strict interpretation of the "nondiscriminatory" requirement
could invalidate some of such programs, which may lead to the withdrawal of GSP benefits altogether. Hence, with its positive view of the
GSP, the AB made its normative decision that fostering the economic
development of developing countries should be the primary goal in interpreting the "nondiscrimination" requirement. Correspondingly, the AB
downplayed the risk that special preferences granted to selected beneficiaries could lead to a fragmented system.
preferences (concluding that the benefits generated by tariff preferences are likely to
be small and pointing out that differentiation among GSP beneficiaries generates
negative international externalities).
309 See THE FUTURE OF THE WTO, supra note 308, ch. II (The erosion of
nondiscrimination)
310 Panel Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 278, 1 7.155-7.158.
311 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences, supra note 11,
169 (footnote
omitted).
312 See Peter M. Gerhart & Archana Seema Kella, Power and Preferences:
Developing Countries and the Role of the WTO Appellate Body, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REc. 515 (Spring 2005), for an analysis on the role the AB has played in
balancing the political forces behind the GSP system through its decision in
EC-Preferences.
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Having decided that the first objective of the Enabling Clause is more
important in interpreting the "nondiscriminatory" requirement, the AB
went a step further in upholding the drug criterion under the Enabling
Clause. As previously noted, the AB did not examine whether tariff preferences can effectively address the special needs of the countries affected
by the drug problem. Given the lack of evidence that the drug preferences can "effectively" address the developmental needs of the drugaffected countries, and given that such preferences necessarily cause fragmentation of the system, the AB could have disallowed the drug criterion
as a legitimate basis for classification of GSP beneficiaries. Instead, the
AB made its normative decision to allow the drug criterion to enter into
the similarity decision despite its tenuous connection with the two objectives of the Enabling Clause.
It is clear that in making these normative decisions the AB applied a
rather lenient standard of review to scrutinize a Member's GSP program.
Despite its articulated "effectiveness" standard, the actual standard
applied by the AB in this case is close to that of a rational connection,
which would not require empirical proof of effectiveness.3 1 3 In comparison, the Panel sought to apply a stricter standard of scrutiny in order to
impose a higher degree of multilateral discipline on the GSP program.
The minimum level of scrutiny applied by the AB under the Enabling
Clause contrasts with the strict standard of scrutiny it has applied under
the chapeau of GATF Article XX,3 14 even though both the Enabling
Clause and Article XX provide exceptions to the MFN obligation in
GATF Article I. The application of a low standard of scrutiny under the
Enabling Clause makes sense, however, for the following reasons. First,
given that GSP benefits are gift-like in nature, a minimum level of multilateral discipline seems appropriate for GSP programs. As long as GSP
programs are perceived as playing a positive role in international trade,
the WTO may not wish to discourage their existence by over-policing
their operations. Second, the application of the Enabling Clause has very
different trade effects from that of Article XX. While an exception under
Article XX leads to the authorization of an increase in trade restrictions,
the Enabling Clause departs from MFN provisions in the direction of
lowering trade barriers from the MFN level. Although GSP programs
may produce trade-distorting effects, 15 such effects are to a large extent
limited by the margin of the MFN rates, which have lowered considerably
since the GSP scheme was first established. Moreover, in this particular
case, the drug preferences offered by the EU were additional benefits to
its existing GSP scheme, which would translate into further reduction of
its overall level of trade barriers. Thus, considering the differences in
trade effects between the two exceptions, it seems reasonable to apply a
313 See Robert Howse, Internet Roundtable, supra note 286, at 248.
314 See supra Section IV.A.3(b).
315

See supra note 308.
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lower standard of scrutiny
under the Enabling Clause than under the cha16
peau of Article XX.3
3.

The Issue of GSP Conditionality

A related but more general issue that can also benefit from the similarly-situated analysis is the issue of GSP conditionality. The AB's holding in EC-Preferences that a binding legal obligation of
nondiscrimination exists under the Enabling Clause has opened the door
for questioning the legality of GSP conditionality. In contrast with GATT
Article I:1, which requires that MFN treatment be extended to all WTO
Members "unconditionally," the Enabling Clause is silent as to whether
preferential treatment for developing countries must be unconditional. In
practice, preference-giving countries have attached various types of conditions or incentives to their GSP schemes, ranging from antiterrorism,
enforcement of arbitral award, expropriation protection, to labor and
environmental standards, to "unfair trade practices." '1 7 Unlike drug production and trafficking, which is a condition prevailing in only a subset of
developing countries, many of the above-mentioned conditions are generally applicable to the developing world.
However, does a generally applicable condition also satisfy the nondiscriminatory requirement of the Enabling Clause? The issue has not
been contested at the WTO dispute settlement forum, although it was
3 18 Intuitively, one
initially raised by India in EC-Preferences.
might think
that a generally applicable condition must be nondiscriminatory in
316

It is interesting to note that the AB's holding that differently situated GSP

beneficiaries should be treated differently seems to be consistent with its ruling in
U.S.-Shrimp that formally identical treatment of differently situated countries is
discriminatory. There is however a difference between the two rulings. In
U.S.-Shrimp, the AB applied a strict standard of review, obligating the United States
to provide different treatment to differently situated countries. In comparison,
applying a less strict level of scrutiny, the AB permits, rather than requires, a Member
to treat differently situated countries differently under the Enabling Clause.
317 See supra text at note 280 for examples of eligibility criteria imposed under U.S.
law. For a summary of EU GSP conditions, see Grossman & Sykes, supra note 279, at
46. See also Lorand Bartels, The WTO Enabling Clause and Positive Conditionalityin
the European Community's GSP Program, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 507 (2003).
318 In addition to the drug program, India originally brought claims with respect to
the EC's special incentive programs for the protection of environment and labor
rights. It subsequently dropped those claims, but reserved its right to bring separate
new complaints on the special incentive programs. Panel Report, EC-Preferences,
supra note 278,
1.5. India had also charged the EC's incentive programs as
"discriminatory" in a Trade Policy Review of the European Union. Bartels, supra note
317, at 525 (citing WTO Document, Trade Policy Review - The European Union Minutes of Meeting on 12 and 14 July 2000, WT/TPR/M/72, 26 October 2000, j 173.)
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nature. 3 19 The similarly-situated analysis, however, will direct us to focus
on the purpose, rather than the generality, of the condition at issue, which
may lead us to a different conclusion.
Conceptually, any condition on the eligibility for tariff preferences is
also a criterion for classifying similarly-situated groups. For example, a
GSP scheme requiring that the beneficiaries observe certain labor standards would divide developing countries into a group that is eligible for
the benefits and a group that is ineligible for the benefits. In order to
determine whether such differentiation is discriminatory, one must assess
whether the basis of classification is conducive to advancing the purpose
of the Enabling Clause.
In accordance with the AB decision in EC-Preferences, the primary
purpose of the Enabling Clause is to foster economic development of
developing countries based on their "development, financial and trade
needs"; therefore, to be nondiscriminatory a condition differentiating
between GSP beneficiaries must be at least rationally related to the
advancement of that purpose. In addition, what constitute the "development, financial and trade needs" of developing countries can be determined by broad-based recognition of such needs set out in the WTO
Agreement or other multilateral treaties. 320 Against this standard, different conditions might fare differently. For conditions that are imposed
completely out of the national interests of the preference-giving country,
such as enforcement of arbitral awards in favor of its citizens and protection of the property of its nationals, it might be very difficult to argue that
these conditions are rationally related to the advancement of economic
development of developing countries. In comparison, for conditions such
as compliance with certain labor and environmental standards, although
they are imposed to address primarily the concerns of preference-giving
countries, it is possible to argue that these standards will benefit the economic growth of the developing countries in the long run based on the
broad recognition of these standards in international agreements. In this
regard, one may further distinguish between "positive" and "negative"
conditionality of the GSP programs. 32 ' Positive conditionality operates as
incentives that provide additional preferences to GSP beneficiaries that
meet certain conditions, such as compliance with certain labor and environmental standards or combating drug trafficking. Negative conditionality, on the other hand, allows the preference-giving country to withdraw
existing GSP benefits when the GSP beneficiary fails to observe specific
conditions. It is therefore arguable that positive conditionality contributes
319 See Bartels, supra note 317, at 525-26 (suggesting that generally applicable
conditions do not discriminate between developing countries on a de jure basis,
although they may discriminate on a de facto basis if on the facts certain countries are
unable to comply with these standards).
320 Appellate Body Report, EC-Preferences,supra note 11, 9 163.
321 See generally Bartels, supra note 317.
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more to the economic development of developing countries than negative
conditionality. 2
In addition, it should be noted that if a condition attached to GSP benefits is consistent with other exceptions to GATT Article 1:1, it should not
run afoul with the non-discriminatory requirement of the Enabling
Clause. The relationship between the Enabling Clause and other MFN
exceptions has not been examined by the WTO tribunals.3 2 3 Nonetheless,
being a general exception to GATT Article I:1, the Enabling Clause cannot logically have a broader scope of application than that of Article 1:1
itself. Accordingly, if a Member can be justified in withholding MFN benefits from another Member based on a regulatory concern recognized by
GATT Article XX (e.g., protection of public morals) or a national security concern under GATT Article XXI (e.g., international terrorism), it
should be allowed to do the same with respect to the GSP benefits. The
only question then is whether the same standard of review should apply
in the context of the Enabling Clause as in the context of Articles XX and
XXI with respect to these grounds. 24 If the above reasoning is correct,
then the generally applicable conditions that could be found as inconsistent with the non-discriminatory requirement of the Enabling Clause
would be limited to those that go beyond the scope of other permitted
MFN exceptions under GATT.
In sum, under the similarly-situated analysis, whether or not a generally applicable condition attached to a GSP program is discriminatory will
depend on whether compliance with the condition serves to advance the
purpose of the Enabling Clause. Such purpose has been interpreted by
the AB as primarily that of fostering economic development of developing countries based on their internationally-recognized developmental
In EC-Preferences,the AB mentioned EU's special incentive arrangements for
the protection of labor rights and environment as a positive example for their
procedural fairness, in contrast with the drug arrangements. Appellate Body Report,
EC-Preferences,supra note 11, s 182. One might take this mention as a sign that the
AB would uphold these particular programs under the Enabling Clause.
323 The issue was raised in EC-Preferences, in which the EC defended its drug
program as necessary for protecting human life or health under GATT Article XX(b).
India argued that Article XX(b) cannot be used to justify tariff preferences because to
allow such a use would have the effect of transferring resources from a country that is
not the source of health problem to countries that are actually the source of the
problem. See Panel Report, EC-Preferences, supra note 278,
7.208. The Panel,
however, did not address the issue directly, stating only that "tariff preferences should
not be lightly assumed to be an appropriate means to achieve health objectives under
Article XX(b) because any tariff preferences deviating from obligations assumed in
the multilateral framework would necessarily have a direct and negative impact on
the multilateral system." Id. 7.209.
324 See supra text at notes 314-316 for discussion regarding different standards of
scrutiny applied by the AB under the Enabling Clause and the chapeau of Article
XX.
322
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needs. In light of the degree of scrutiny applied by the AB in
EC-Preferences, a condition will not be held to be discriminatory if it
appears to be rationally related to the advancement of such purpose.
Given this minimum standard of review, many of the generally applicable
conditions currently in use should be able to withstand challenge under
the nondiscrimination obligation of the Enabling Clause.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In EC-Preferences, the Appellate Body interpreted nondiscrimination
as a requirement not to treat the "similarly situated" countries differently. Indeed, the notion of treating the "similarly situated" alike is inherent in the term "nondiscrimination." Within the WTO context, the
concept of "similarly situated" is embodied not only in some of the generally-worded nondiscrimination provisions of the WTO agreements, which
function outside the realm of the MFN and NT obligations, but also in
the terms "like products," "like services" and "like service suppliers,"
which define MFN and NT obligations under GATT and GATS. Despite
the importance of the "similarly situated" concept for WTO nondiscrimination obligations, however, how to determine likeness or similarity
between products, services or countries remains one of most controversial and perplexing issues in WTO jurisprudence.
This paper seeks to explore and develop a general approach to analyzing the likeness or similarity issues within the WTO context. Under this
approach, we are directed to focus on the object and purpose of the WTO
rule that contains the "likeness" or "similarity" concept or otherwise
requires a "likeness" or "similarity" comparison between the concerned
subjects. The criteria for determining likeness or similarity, or the bases
for drawing distinctions, between the concerned subjects must be relevant
to the rule's object and purpose - that is, such criteria must be conducive
to, useful, or necessary for the advancement of the object and purpose of
the rule. The identification of the relationship between the purpose of the
rule and the basis for determining likeness or similarity under the rule is
of pivotal importance. Without a clear understanding of this relationship,
we will be at loss how to choose a relevant criterion for determining likeness or similarity. Unless a criterion is indispensable for furthering the
goal of the rule, however, whether to use it in determining likeness or
similarity is a matter of normative decision.
When it is not possible to identify in advance all the relevant criteria
for determining likeness or similarity under a given WTO rule, it is conceptually sound to focus on the purpose of a Member's measure that has
allegedly made an impermissible classification of products, services or
countries under that rule. The purpose of the measure may be identified
objectively or based on the assertion of the Member, depending on the
decision of the treaty interpreter. For a challenged classification effected
by the measure to be permissible, the purpose of the measure must be
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legitimate - i.e., consistent with the requirements of the WTO rule - and
the basis for classification must be relevant to the advancement of that
purpose. Again, unless that classification is indispensable for achieving a
legitimate purpose of the measure, whether to allow such classification is
a matter of normative decision.
The normative questions raised in the likeness or similarity determinations not only concern whether a particular criterion for comparison
should be allowed, but also whether the purpose of a Member's measure
is permissible, what ought to be the purpose of a given rule, and what the
primary purpose of a given rule is if multiple purposes are identified. In
making these normative decisions, the WTO tribunal will consider the
values it deems important to the multilateral system. A fundamental issue
to be determined is how to strike a balance between the values of international coordination through WTO policing of Member measures and the
values of preserving the national autonomy of Member governments. The
normative judgment made in each likeness or similarity determination
also reflects a certain standard of review applied by the tribunal in scrutinizing the measure. Although WTO tribunals have not articulated the
standards of scrutiny applicable in the likeness or similarity determinations under WTO provisions, the particular standard applied in a given
case may be discernible.
Based on the formulation of this general approach, the paper has
examined the concept of "like products" within the context of GATT
Article III, where WTO likeness jurisprudence is most developed, and
the concept of "like conditions" under GATT Article XX, GATS Article
XIV, SPS Agreement, and the Enabling Clause, where such jurisprudence is still at an early stage of development. With respect to "like products," the paper has applied the "similarly situated" paradigm to evaluate
the AB's approach, as well as the controversial "aim and effects" test, in
defining the concept. The examination revealed a certain inconsistency in
the AB's position with respect to the relevance of the regulatory aim of a
measure to the interpretation of Article III, and suggested that a strict
standard of scrutiny has been applied by the AB in defining "like products" under the provision.
With respect to the concept of "like conditions," the paper has introduced the handful of WTO cases in which the concept has been discussed
under GATT Article XX, GATS Article XIV, and the SPS Agreement.
Upon examination of the relevant discussions in these cases, it becomes
clear that WTO tribunals have not sufficiently focused on an analysis of
the concept, much less formed a coherent approach towards its interpretation. This lack of adequate attention to the concept of like conditions in
turn has confused the analysis under these provisions and created some
gaps, ambiguities and inconsistencies in their interpretation. In particular,
insufficient analysis of the concept of like conditions has led the AB to
generate potentially problematic jurisprudence under the chapeau of
GATT Article XX. The examination of these cases has also revealed that
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the tribunals applied a strict standard of review under the chapeau of
GATT Article XX, especially with respect to a measure that was formally
origin-neutral and had a legitimate regulatory purpose. In an interesting
contrast, the AB appears to have adopted a less strict standard when a
measure having a bona fide regulatory purpose was scrutinized under the
nondiscrimination provision of the SPS Agreement.
Lastly, the similarly-situated paradigm has been applied to examine the
"nondiscriminatory" requirement of the Enabling Clause. The analysis of
the case EC-Preferenceshas shown how different norms and values could
guide the tribunals to reach different conclusions on the basis for determining similarly-situated countries. The analysis has also revealed that
the AB set a rather lenient standard of review for scrutinizing GSP's
compliance with the nondiscriminatory requirement of the Enabling
Clause. Utilizing the similarly-situated paradigm to address the issue of
GSP conditionality, the paper further suggests that generally applicable
conditions of the GSP do not necessarily comply with the nondiscriminatory requirement of the Enabling Clause.
This paper has provided an analytical framework for assessing the
"similarly situated" issues within the context of the WTO. Given that the
notion of treating the similarly situated alike is inherent in the notion of
nondiscrimination and that the concept of likeness or similarity lies at the
heart of major WTO nondiscrimination obligations, this analytical framework makes it possible to define nondiscrimination under WTO law in an
inherently coherent manner.

